


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21 MARCH 1988



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-88-020

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## ISRAEL

### Knesset Member Discusses Uprising, Likud Policy

44040124 Jerusalem AL-NAHAR in Arabic  
21 Jan 88 p 12

[Interview With Likud Knesset Member Michael Eytan: "West Bank and Strip Riots May Go on for 50 Years; No to a 'Third State'; Our Friendship With the United States Is Firm"; date and place not given]

[Text] How to end the riots in the occupied territories, the transfer, the concept of a Palestinian state, the future of the West Bank, the international conference, the Likud platform for the coming elections and other issues were the focus of the interview conducted by AL-NAHAR with Michael Eytan, a Likud Knesset member.

[Question] You declare that you do not support the idea of deporting the Arabs from their lands—the transfer. What do you support?

[Answer] I support a joint framework on the "land of Israel" for both the Jews and the Arabs. When I say the "land of Israel," I mean the land on both banks of the Jordan River, i.e. the West Bank and the East Bank. What I mean by the West Bank is "Israel's land" west of the river. When I speak of Judea and Samarra I will mention them by name.

I begin with an essential point, namely that in "Israel's land" on "both banks of the river," there are two peoples who must develop a national solution. The first are the Arab people "of the land of Israel" and the second are the Jewish people "of the land of Israel." You call it Palestine whereas we call it the "land of Israel." Palestine existed on the two banks of the river and Israel now exists on the two banks of the river.

What I want to say is that there is a problem and that a solution must be found for both the Arabs and the Jews. The fundamental problem is that there is nobody with whom we can speak. Why? Because King Husayn is not prepared to speak in the name of all of the "Arabs of the land of Israel."

I cannot agree to a delegation with two leaders. We must talk to one leader only because what will happen is that each leader will try to draw the negotiations toward certain interests. Therefore, I do not approve of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. I also believe that the existence of the state of Israel is determined prior to the negotiations and not after the negotiations and a peace treaty. If a war has to be fought, then I prefer that this war be fought now and not after the conclusion of a peace treaty. For those who want peace, now is also the right time. We will not approve the creation of a third state.

### Palestinian State... Where?

[Question] Do you mean that Jordan is the Palestinian state? How do you see this?

[Answer] Yes. A confederation can be established with Israel or Jordan can be a state for the Palestinians and King Husayn can be the king of the Palestinians. I want one partner, not two, in the negotiations.

As for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, suitable proper arrangements can be made to allow the inhabitants of these territories to live properly and to enjoy all the rights they had enjoyed prior to 1967.

I am not talking about returning the occupied territories but about the possibility of turning the clock back with regard to the population and not the territories and about establishing suitable arrangements, i.e. permitting the inhabitants to be citizens of the Palestinian state in Jordan east of the river, to elect a parliament and to serve this state's army while Israel remains in control of the territories in which the inhabitants live. What I mean is that the parliament, army and everything will be in the capital of this state—Amman—and the government of the "Jordanian Palestine" will be in charge of education, health, agriculture and all the daily affairs of these inhabitants. The government of the "Jordanian Palestine" will be in charge of all of this. The same goes for the Jews now inhabiting the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They will be totally tied to the State of Israel. I believe that when we develop a compromise, this can be achieved. There are 130,000 square kilometers of land on both sides of the river. All we are disputing are 7,000 square kilometers. If a compromise is achieved within the 90,000 square kilometers—meaning the area of the East Bank—then a solution can be reached for the 7,000 kilometers, meaning the West Bank area. This will be a temporary program for the present generation and not a final solution. Negotiations can be resumed after this program.

### Herut and Annexation

On the Academic Day, organized a few days ago by the Hebrew University, you spoke about an item in the Herut Movement program demanding the "liberation of the entire land of Israel," meaning the west and east banks. What would be the population's status should such annexation take place?

[Answer] On Academic Day, I discussed the thinking that prevailed in the Herut Movement since the party was founded and until Begin gained the premiership and asked King Husayn to negotiate. This shows that the Begin of 1948 is not the Begin of 1967 who recognized the reality of the Kingdom of Jordan east of the river. Within the framework of the Camp David accords, Begin recognizes not only the Kingdom of Jordan east of the river but also Jordan's interests west of the river, namely in Judea and Samarra. This means that there

has been a change in the position of the Herut Party leaders. Whereas they had previously demanded liberation of the land of Israel on both banks of the river, they have now recognized Jordan and ceded it. They are also prepared to talk about a certain situation west of the river.

As for annexation, the Likud policy is embodied in the fact that there is no call for annexing "Judea and Samarra" at present because the future of this area is, in accordance with the Camp David accords, tied to a provisional self-rule period and because the self-rule program must be given a chance. We hope that the Israeli public will be the judge on this issue in the forthcoming elections to be held in the near future.

### **Policies and Programs**

[Question] What is the policy and the program which the Likud Party plans to project as its platform for the coming elections?

[Answer] The program of self-rule, plus direct negotiations through a "regional conference"—meaning a conference that includes Jordan, Egypt and Israel—to reach an agreement with Israel and the Arab public on the "land of Israel."

### **"International"**

[Question] Why do you oppose the international conference concept and demand a "regional conference" calling for direct negotiations?

[Answer] Because we do not want resolutions to be dictated to us by the Soviet Union. If I knew that the international conference would obstruct the creation of a third state, I would approve it. But this conference will ultimately lead to the creation of a third state.

### **Demography**

[Question] In a lecture he delivered on Academic Day, Moshe Arens said that the "demographic problem" poses no threat to Israel. What is your opinion on this "problem?"

[Answer] Even if the demographic problem exists, it does not, in my opinion, affect the situation because there is no connection between the demographic problem and the problem of borders and security. The demographic problem will continue even if the Israeli forces withdraw from the camps. On the other hand, the achievement of a political solution will improve the living, economic and educational conditions. This will ultimately result in a demographic balance because the Arab inhabitants will be more vigilant and will produce less offspring so that they may be able to provide their children with education and culture. Therefore, I don't believe that the demographic problem poses a threat. Shimon Peres is exploiting this "problem" for political propaganda.

Whoever calls for a solution because of this problem is like Kahane who does not believe in coexistence with the Arabs. I believe in joint coexistence with the Arabs. I say that there is a problem of friction with them and that we must achieve a solution to coexist in this area. I do not plan to annex the inhabitants of "Judea and Samarra" to Israel and I do not plan to give them the right of election to the Knesset. I want them to get their political rights through parliamentary representation in Jordan. I want them to live happily here as the Arabs in Jaffa, Tel Aviv and Haifa now live. Jordanian citizens can also live in "Judea and Samarra" and take part in Jordan's parliamentary elections.

Jews can also live near Nabulus and Hebron and can take part in the Israeli Knesset elections. The problem is how to develop good relations between the Arab and the Jew.

### **Lahat-Amirav**

[Question] They are now talking in the press about "doves" in the Likud Party itself in the wake of Moshe Amirav's initiative and Lahat's statements. What is your opinion in this regard?

[Answer] Lahat's statements have been well known for a long time. The problem is that he made this statement in a dramatic manner which has drawn attention. Lahat operates in the Likud Party at a municipal level. As for Amirav, I have not seen his program in its entirety. Amirav has been criticized for his actions, not words, because he has exploited the media to serve his interest.

### **West Bank Riots**

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the proper means at present to end the riots on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. What, to your mind, will happen in the near future?

[Answer] I believe that this situation may continue in one form or another for 50 more years. I blame the Israeli government because it is in charge and it has not controlled the situation as it should. The government is responsible for law and order among the population.

After a new wave, the government will perhaps now learn how to respond to acts of this sort. We must reach a phase of joint coexistence, not necessarily of permanent tranquility in the area. Look at Lebanon, Syria and other countries. Certain problems always exist. However, we must find a way for Arabs and Jews to coexist and we must exploit our capacity to serve this positive, not negative, issue. This solution may not please some people but it may please the majority.

[Question] Do you think that the United States will change its position toward Israel, considering that there have been signs of a change, such as the condemnation of Israel in the United Nations for its actions on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, not to mention the effects of the U.S. public opinion?

[Answer] There are temporary changes and long-term changes. Such changes also occur here in the Israeli government and public opinion circles. Do you think that the Israeli public likes to see what is happening on the television screen and likes to have the troops sent where they are sent? But this is inevitable. If the situation continues and gets more serious, then these acts must be stopped and force must be used.

As for the long-term U.S. position, there will be no change on America's part because Israel is strategically important to the United States.

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**Growing Israeli, Arab Extremism Seen**  
TA072036 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew  
7 Mar 88 p [no pages given]

[Report by Shmu'el Tal]

[Excerpt] "We are sitting on a powder keg in relation to everything concerning Israeli Arabs," Brigadier General 'Amos Gilbo'a, the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, says. "On 'Peace Day' we witnessed the first violent signs of this phenomenon. The hostile activity, such as the hurling of Molotov cocktails in various places in Israel, is evidence of the fact that we are facing the start of a dangerous trend."

A few days ago, Brig Gen Gilbo'a presented to the prime minister a detailed document on Israeli Arabs which examines the situation and offers proposals for implementation. This is the third document that he has presented to the Prime Minister's Office on this issue, and HADASHOT has learned that Deputy Minister Roni Milo will soon discuss it with the prime minister. In the document, Brig Gen Gilbo'a warns that the developments in the Arab sector are evidence that the rules of the game have changed, and that Israeli Arabs have decided to take an active part in solving the problem of the territories.

The extremist religious elements among Israeli Arabs are being strengthened at the expense of the moderates, Gilbo'a believes. The Arab sector is on the verge of an explosion, and nationalism has taken control. He said that when he warned about the Palestinization process transforming the Arab sector in his first document, everybody expressed angry surprise, and the proposals he presented to the Inner Cabinet went unanswered. He says that this time it appears that even the blind can see the facts: The great majority of Israeli Arabs identify

with the Arabs in the territories. They send them hundreds of trucks full of donations, food, blankets, and medicine; organize solidarity demonstrations on a national and regional level; organize nationalist gatherings and sit-ins, especially by women near the local council buildings; and Israeli Arab figures visit the territories.

More and more nationalist songs can be heard in the Arab sector. The climax was reached with the discovery of violence, such as the hurling of Molotov cocktails, raising of PLO flags, and calling out of slogans. The Palestinian nationalist awakening within the Green Line has taken on a concrete form, and the impression is that the Arab sector is at a cross-roads.

Brig Gen Gilbo'a believes that, excluding the Bedouin and Druze, the wind in the Arab sector is blowing in the direction of an effort to demonstrate nationalist unity on both sides of the Green Line, and to present the PLO as their representative. This trend is finding expression in various activities by Israeli Arabs for the Palestinians in the territories. These activities are being organized by the National Committee of Arab Local Councils which is urging extremism and calling for Israeli Arabs to support Palestinian activities in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. This organization has grouped together with several other bodies which have mass media capabilities, as well as many activist committees. The prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs has the impression that for the time being all these bodies are operating within the law, and support a non-violent struggle through various means put at their disposal by the Israeli establishment, but he is concerned that in the future a nationalist outbreak will be unavoidable. The dams holding this up at present will not be able to withstand the flood in the future, he said. When that time comes, practical men in the Arab sector, who at present identify with the State of Israel, will have to give up identifying with Zionist aims. Many of them believe that the establishment does not support them and others like them and leaves them incapable of withstanding the pressures of the extremists. For instance, the lack of contact which Gilbo'a believes at present characterizes relations between Israeli Arabs and the establishment, does not provide them with the financial resources with which they could face the problems the Arab local councils place before them. (more)

The elections are already in the air in the Arab sector, and in the final analysis the Zionist parties will lose many votes, Gilbo'a believes. The heads of the local councils are now careful not to oppose the views now taking hold among the inhabitants of their villages. The fear is that there are no longer specific personalities which can be pressured and convinced, since those who were in touch with the establishment in the past are no longer the decision makers.

The prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs believes that immediate action must be taken to neutralize these dangerous moves, which he believes could bring the

entire Arab sector to stand united behind the extremist elements. He believes that a vigorous campaign must be held to bring Israeli Arabs who identify with the aims of the State closer to the establishment, and that active measures must be taken to convert them into influential figures in the entire establishment. Israel must make clear it will not accept irregularities in such fields as nationalism, criminal acts and incitement, and toward that end it must use without hesitation the police and other security arms against hostile elements, as well as all the available legal means at our disposal, including measures used in times of emergencies.

The measures aimed at bringing the moderates closer to the establishment must be taken in such a way as to make it clear to everybody that this is the official position of the entire State of Israel. This could be done through contacts between high level figures who are not necessarily tied to the political system, and Arab leaders in Israel. Brig Gen Gilbo'a also believes that more vigorous action must be taken to cut down to a minimum the exposure of Israeli Arabs to hostile media and to incitement from outside, while increasing their exposure to the media which reflect the official positions of the State.

Senior government sources believe that if such steps are taken further extremism could still be avoided. They said that we are still at a stage where matters can be corrected, but that this must be done vigorously, and that the necessary resources must be extended for this purpose. The sources also believe that vigorous action must be taken to make clear to all that the Druze and the Bedouin are not included among those elements considered problematic. "The State of Israel must do this in such a way that it will be seen to be taking place," these sources said. The Druze and the Bedouin identify with the State of Israel, and have been considered loyal and devoted citizens throughout the State of Israel's existence. We must make sure that hostile elements do not have access to them, and that it will not be possible to radicalize them by stressing so-called "discrimination," the sources said. [passage omitted]

#### **Ibrahim Nimr Husayn Cultivates Political Influence for Local Councils**

44230008b Jerusalem KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew  
30 Dec 87 pp 18, 40-43

[Article by Ari Shavit]

[Text] At the Yagur junction there is no sign indicating the road to the city of Shefar'am. On the other hand, there is a giant sign indicating the direction to little Shelomi, 44 km to the north. Perhaps in the Ministry of Transport there are some people who believe that roads are designed only for Jews. Between you and me, the Arabs will find the road even without signs.

When I mentioned the absence of the sign to Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, the mayor of Shefar'am and head of the national committee of local Arab councils, he said that

he had already appealed to the Ministry of Transport in connection with this matter several times, but received no response. It is good that I remind him. Perhaps he will again appeal to the ministry this week. Husayn, who is known better as Abu-Hatim, undoubtedly, is the media celebrity behind "Peace Day," the Pini Grov of Israel's Arabs. Like Grov he is also relatively moderate. He tries to avoid violence. He too has led his public almost anonymously for years, until he was exposed suddenly. But the comparison ends here. The unsuccessful weapon of Pini Grov from ATA was emotionalism and near hysteria. Abu-Hatim's weapon is cool deliberation. He does not ask for pity or favors and is not an extremist, but is well aware of his strength. He evokes respect. It will not be possible to defeat Abu-Hatim as easily as it was to defeat Grov. Not 3,000 desperate adult workers, but 700,000 Israeli Arabs—a public whose situation has never been better—stand behind him.

The national committee headed by Abu-Hatim is sometimes called the government of Israel's Arabs. In fact, this is a kind of national unity government of Israel's Arabs, its main strength lying in placing various political factors under one roof. In the last few years this realization has been slowly penetrating into official Israel. Avner Regev, today director of the Jewish-Arab Institute at Oholo and former adviser to Mota Gur, has been preaching for this realization for years. He believes that ultimately the committee will establish a political lobby, without the support of which no bloc will be able to form a government. In contrast to the Shamir Government, which does not have the talent or the determination to lead the Jews, Abu-Hatim's committee succeeds without any means of coercion to impose its authority on almost all Israel's Arabs. Abu-Hatim has no organization, a team of secretaries, or even a PR man. He himself answers the telephone in his office in the municipality of Shefar'am. He himself opens the door of his modest home to me, which is decorated with one sign: "Knock on the door." His authority is natural and fatherly, of the old dignitary type.

Husayn, 59 years old, is moderate in his nature and cautious in his expressions. If he were the mayor of Ramallah, not of Shefar'am, he would be the realization of Israeli aspiration for authentic Palestinian leadership with which one can talk, a kind of rural Anwar Nusseibeh. From the Alignment to the Progressive List they have offered him a seat in the Knesset, but so far he has declined it. His strength lies in his independence. On the morning of "Peace Day" his leadership was put to the test. Several "villagers" tried to congregate in Shefar'am and incite it. The mayor did away with them without any difficulty. Abu-Hatim is perhaps the last Palestinian leader capable of being relatively moderate and of having authority at the same time. "It is very difficult for us," he says. "We are at the most painful point of the dispute, because we got stuck in a paradox: Our nation is at war with our state. I think that nowhere in the world is there such a minority." The committee which he heads has two declared goals: to achieve equality for the

Palestinians inside Israel and to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. The phrase "peace and equality" is frequently—perhaps too often—repeated in Abu-Hatim's conversation, as in that of other Israeli Arabs. When he uses it for the first time during our conversation, it seems to me that I know what he is referring to. When he repeats it 14 times in 1 hour, whether it is needed or not, I try to find out what peace and what equality he is referring to. "The Government of Israel," says the committee head, "must make peace with the government of the Palestinian people—the PLO. There is no other way." Does "peace and equality" also include the Law of Return? "This law is discriminatory. It gives the right to immigrate to those who have no past here and, on the other hand, denies the right of return to the Palestinian who lives here and who has become a refugee due to political problems. In order for the law to be fair, both Jews and Palestinians should have the right to return."

### Self-Confidence

The head of the national committee does not hide his pride in the body that he heads. According to his evaluation, if the committee had not existed, the same chaos as exists in the territories would have been created in the Arab sector. What is happening in the West Bank and Gaza demonstrates that, when there is no leadership, the street does what it wants—today the street is disposed toward extremism. "Today the Arab sector has a great deal of self-confidence," he says. "We have made progress with respect to organization. In the past there was traditional leadership, which wanted to close deals under the table. Today we have educated leadership, which knows where it is going. Even representatives of Zionist parties—Knesset members Wattad and Darawshe—do not talk the way they did once. Today there is pride. The Arab in Israel is walking with a straight back and a raised head. He is happy. He is content, because today the entire Arab sector is more united under strong leadership, which is concerned with the well-being of the entire Arab public."

Nevertheless, he sees no reason to demand that Israel be redefined as a binational state now. He knows that this demand will be rejected and will cause a commotion in vain on the Jewish street. Nor does he believe in one Arab national list for the Knesset. "How will it help us?" He says this with the wisdom of an experienced minority leader. "Such a list will only lead to the the Jewish parties unifying against us. They will claim that we want autonomy. No, it is easier to work through existing parties." I asked why the Arab leadership did not condemn the violent events during "Peace Day." "There were disorders in only 3 or 4 out of 120 settlements," he said. "This is very little." I told him that many Jews fought against Kahane and I asked why the Arab leadership could not take an unequivocal stand against the Arab extremists who cried "kill the Jews."

Husayn: "Extremism does not serve the interests of Israel's Arabs."

I continued to persist. "Kahane's opponents," I said, "do not oppose him because he harms Jewish interests. They oppose him morally. They say that he is a fascist and a Nazi. Why can you not say that a person that calls for the killing of Jews is like Kahane?"

Then, after 10 minutes of insistent requests, he declared: "You can write on my behalf that I oppose anyone who wants to kill the Jews. If someone cries Nazi slogans, I reject them completely."

I did not succeed in eliciting such a decisive declaration from attorney Kamal Dahir. Dahir is the head of the opposition in the municipality of Nazareth, one of the founders of the Progressive Movement for Peace and one of its ideologists. In contrast to Husayn, Dahir is a complete Israeli. Whereas a miniature wooden model of the Mosque of 'Umar stands in the corner of Husayn's living room, a calendar of the Israeli phoenix hangs on the wall of Dahir's office. There are blue rows of books of court verdicts in Hebrew on the shelves. Like any other Israeli politician, Dahir also quotes Ben-Gurion again and again, and the newspaper that he takes home for the Sabbath is YEDI'OT AHARONOT. But Dahir, the son of a former Knesset member on the Alignment's satellite list, a good Nazareth boy who was raised in wealth and confidence since his youth, is not only more Israeli than Abu-Hatim—he is also much more Palestinian. Israeliization and Palestinization are two phenomena that go hand in hand in the Arab sector. On the road between Shefar'am and Nazareth, one is not only amazed to see how Arab the Galilee is, but also how Israeli this Arab Galilee is. Both in the villages and in Nazareth shop signs are bilingual. Hebrew appears first on many of them. This does not happen in Quebec and Flanders. There the fight is over languages, not over land.

In contrast to Husayn, Dahir's Hebrew is excellent. During 2 and 1/2 hours of conversation the only Hebrew word that he missed, apparently by accident, was "courage."

Despite my pleas and naggings, Kamal Dahir persisted in his refusal to find something worthy of denunciation on "Peace Day." "The occupation is to blame, the police is to blame, the authorities are to blame," he answered. "I don't denounce a child who throws a stone against the occupation and breaks glass," he said. "I don't denounce. I don't denounce. And I think that those who denounce, err." Finally, I asked him my pestering question about "kill the Jews." "I did not hear that people said this. But if someone said 'kill the Jews,' I oppose this. There are good and bad Jews." When I listened to his clear and decisive words, I thought that there was still an abyss between the practice of Jewish-Israeli self-criticism and the practice of criticism among the Palestinians. Despite the ideological meeting points between Dahir and the Jewish members of his party, the mental distance between them is amazing. He does not have a bad word to say about his people, they do not have a good word to say about their people. They do not have a

bad word to say about his people, he does not have a good word to say about their people. Toward the end of our conversation I finally discovered that, nevertheless, there was one Palestinian act of which even Dahir had real criticism: Hanna Sinyora's intention since last summer to run in the elections to the municipality of Jerusalem.

The conversation with Dahir is almost honest. I ask difficult questions—once from a fanatic Palestinian angle and once from an apprehensive Jewish angle—and Dahir probably wonders, and not by accident, if I am a sympathetic man of conscience, or a hostile Ben-Gurionist. Slowly the true pain and true feelings begin to surface. Dahir's analyses are so logical and consistent that it is difficult not to accept them and to become convinced that from his point of view he is completely right. As an Israeli Jew, and more precisely as a dove, it is very difficult to digest his words. He is already sufficiently sure and does not need the routine expression, which Husayn still takes care to mention, that is, stating that Israel's Arabs are loyal to their state. Dahir is already beyond the cliché of loyalty. Instead of this, he talks about action within the framework of the law. Husayn talks about the PLO with a certain discomfort. Dahir speaks about it almost with awesome reverence. Israel represents his political identity, while the PLO, his national aspirations. In all his answers he maneuvers with caution in the no-man's-land between two compulsions: not to contradict the organization's positions and not to disobey the law. Like Husayn, he opposes the Law of Return, but, unlike Husayn, the creation of a symmetry between the Law of Return and giving refugees the right to return will not satisfy him. "There is a difference between people who were here and whose homes and land are still here, and those who were not in the country at all, or who left it 2000 years ago." When the time comes, he would like to legally change the state flag, perhaps to add a crescent next to the star of David. But it is still early to talk about this, and Kamal Dahir has patience, a great deal of patience.

"The continuation of the occupation removes the green line, the line separating the Arabs living in the state and the Arabs living under the occupation. If the occupation continues, we will not be able to be strict about this separation any longer, and tomorrow there will also be people in the Galilee who will talk about a new political identity, or will question their identity as Israelis. In this matter we are reaching the boiling point. If the occupation continues, some will talk about a binational state and others will talk about self-determination for the residents of the triangle and the Galilee as well."

#### More Violence

"The State of Israel was forced on us. If we were to return to 1948, I would prefer that it were not established and that Palestine would continue to exist. But it is a fact and I accept it. The Arabs also accept it and not with joy.

Today political forces do not want to fight the state and defeat it, but to attain their rights within the framework of the law and help their brothers. I don't know what will be in 10 years.

"I am afraid that the solution will not be attained unless the Israelis feel the problem on their doorstep, whether through additional attacks or riots under international pressure. Some people learn only after riots and wars and do not learn from quiet. They were able to reach an agreement for the separation of forces with Egypt only after the Ramadan war, and they will be able to talk to the Palestinians only after more riots, after they kill 40 or 50 people.

"If they now continue to kill children in the bank, or hit and arrest 16-year old boys and leave them exposed to the rain, acts of violence will also continue in the Arab sector and within Nazareth. I will tell you more: the situation will become aggravated. There will be more violence. It will be more difficult. If they don't solve the occupation problem, tomorrow it will not be a stone, there will be other things. You will not be able to prevent this." Like Israeli ultra-hawks, Dahir also believes that the way to peace passes through violence. He is proud of the terrorist who arrived on a glider and entered the gate of an IDF camp in his uniform. "There will be many more glider nights," he says. He sees an important change in the Palestinian's readiness to die for a political purpose. He does not talk about the events of recent weeks as a tragedy, but as an achievement. The sacrifice of the Palestinians killed in camps was not in vain. Their death advances the Palestinian cause throughout the world. Dahir believes in the right of the residents in the territories to oppose the occupation with violence. His words portray an elegant Palestinian division of labor: the Palestinians outside the 1967 borders will act with violence, the Palestinians in the United States will appear on television and explain, and the Palestinians in Israel will try to exploit the internal political game as much as possible, while staying within the confines of the law.

Nevertheless, Dahir extends his hand toward the Zionist left; he proposes a political alignment of all the factors left of the Labor Party when the common minimum platform is the fight for the end of the occupation. He estimates the electoral strength of such an alignment at about 20 mandates, perhaps even 30. Dahir does not hide his philosophy of stages: "I am prepared to make ad-hoc agreements that will bring me closer to my goal," he says. "If an end to the occupation comes as a result of the activity of a common body, then I, as a national Palestinian, will be closer to my goal. I don't demand that the Citizens' Rights Movement agrees in advance to my opinion of the Law of Return."

In the meantime, however, there is an additional small disagreement between Dahir, on the one hand, and the Citizens' Rights Movement and MAPAM, on the other. While the Jewish left saw in the events of recent weeks an

expression of the Palestinians' great despair, Dahir sees in them a clear sign of the hope stirring in them: "Today I feel better than a month ago. I feel that our people have more strength. I am proud of the fact that the Arabs within the green line have the strength to organize themselves together and that our national identity is more crystallized. Time does not work for the good of the State of Israel. It works for the good of the Palestinians. The economy depends more and more on us. Today the Palestinian Arabs have more strength than they had 10 years ago. In another 10 years they will have much more strength. This will have an effect, this will have an effect.

"We feel that we have embarked on a correct path. The force of initiative is not in the hands of activists and public figures, but in the hands of children, students, and workers. This is the chief thing, because you will never be able to do away with this. Today there are 40,000 students and tomorrow there will be 60,000. Today there are 400,000 pupils and tomorrow there will be 600,000. Therefore, we feel stronger. We are fighting for our identity, for our honor, and for our land. We have also become cleverer. Our reaction has become more sophisticated. When other people are afraid of Rabin's and Herzog's threats, I am satisfied. I feel the strength in the hands of the Arabs living in the State of Israel. We can influence what will happen tomorrow or the day after tomorrow."

To the extent that Dahir's approach represents a significant part of Israel's Arabs, what surfaces now is the ripening in the country of an Arab national movement, which is rigid and sure of itself, challenging the old and weak national movement of the Jews. Israel's Arabs, who have such a point of view, are pessimistic about the chances for peace, but are more and more optimistic about their chances in the fight. "Hatred is intensifying," says Dahir, "both among the Jews and the Arabs." But wherever he looks, he sees signs of a big historical change, which improves his situation. "If you continue to hold the Bank, in 20 years there will be a state where 40 to 50 percent of the residents are Palestinian. The nuclear reactor in Dimona will not protect you against the situation that will be created. You will not be able to bomb Yafo with F-16's. A military force will not help you. Time is in our favor, in our favor. There will also be a change in the American position, as was the case with respect to the Vietnam War. Just as the media and public opinion forced the establishment to end the war there, so it will also happen in Israel."

Dahir does not see any concession in Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. His argument will confuse the doves and will make Geula Cohen happy: "If you believe in the undivided Land of Israel, then withdrawal is a concession. But if you don't believe in this, you don't give up anything." Can Israelis be certain that a withdrawal to the 1967 borders will not bring about a demand for additional withdrawals? Dahir does not commit himself: "We demand a withdrawal from the territories occupied

in 1967. But I don't have to talk about borders. They will be the subject of negotiations between the Palestinian state that will be established after the withdrawal, and Israel. If there is true peace anyway, borders are of no great importance."

Nevertheless, Kamal Dahir believes in a compromise solution. When I ask him if the wound of 1948 still hurts, he answers in the affirmative: The scar has remained, but one learns to live with the wound. It greatly disturbs him that "Peace Now" demonstrators live in former Arab neighborhoods. He believes that, ultimately, those with a conscience will not want to continue living in a house vacated by another person. Since he prefers that the two nations not fight endlessly, he will not demand the removal of Jews from those homes as a condition for the solution of the dispute. But this is only his opinion. After all, he was not expelled from his home in Nazareth. The opinion of a refugee from 'En Hilweh perhaps will be different, less tolerant.

11439

**AI System To Monitor RPV Performance**  
*44230008a Jerusalem KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew*  
30 Dec 87 p 39

[Excerpt] A small pilotless plane needs a human operator, who will remain at the ground station and navigate or give operating remote control instructions. Even if the small pilotless plane is "clever" and can execute the mission almost independently, there is a need for a human operator, who will know how to handle malfunctions when they occur (unfortunately, they always do). An analysis of missions of small pilotless plane operators has made it clear that the operator is required to execute under the pressure of time an operation integrating much data creating an "information load," which is difficult for a human being to handle. Moreover, as the operator's skill and experience diminish, the reasonableness of a critical error intensifies.

The artificial intelligence group in the aircraft industry, in cooperation with the IET Company from Tel Aviv, has developed an artificial intelligence system (expert system), which aids the performance of unmanned vehicles. The system makes evaluations of an unmanned vehicle's condition according to data transmitted to the operator's station. The system can warn about a malfunction and advise the operator about methods of operation for the continuation of the instrument's smooth performance and, thus improve the unmanned vehicle's survivability.

11439

**IDF Introduces New Chemical Warfare Detectors**  
*44230008c Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew*  
16 Dec 87 p 6

[Article by Raz Yosef]

[Text] In recent weeks the IDF has been equipping itself with several new means of detecting and identifying chemicals.

"Galnit," a chemical detector, produced by Elbit, is currently being purchased. The detector absorbs air and warns about the presence of chemicals and their type and amount.

The IDF will also be equipped with "kafgaz"—"kaftor gaz" ["gas button"]—for the detection and identification of chemicals. It will be attached to the B/CW mask and will change its color from yellow to another color at the moment it localizes a chemical. Special paper for the detection and identification of chemicals will be glued to soldiers' clothes. When the paper absorbs a chemical material (similar to the idea of litmus paper), small red dots will appear on it. This paper will soon be put to use at all IDF levels.

11439

### **Pathology Lab Investigated for Falsification in Terrorist Incidents**

44230004b Jerusalem KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew  
No 261 Dec 87 pp 13-15, 53

[Article by Naomi Levitsky: "The Stench is Rising from the Pathology Institute"]

[Text] Quincy doesn't work there: Doctors at the Institute of Forensic Medicine at Abu-Kabir had difficulty, in a number of instances, in determining the true stories of the corpses they autopsied. In two cases—bus route number 300 and General Security Service (GSS) inter-roguee 'Awwad Hamdan—their opinions were used to conceal the truth, not to uncover it. This week, the Ministry of Health is about to announce the start of an inquiry into the pathology institute's investigation. Below are some of the accounts that were put "on ice."

Dr. Bartolon Levi was one of the two pathologists whose professional opinion played a major role in misleading the investigators in the bus route number 300 affair. It was also Levi's fate to perform the autopsy on the body of 'Awwad Hamdan, a West Bank resident who died during an interrogation by the GSS on the suspicion of being a member of a hostile organization. The GSS investigators relied on his opinion when they claimed that Hamdan died of pneumonia. The two incidents have seriously damaged the trust of the judicial system, especially the advocacy, in the pathology lab. Knesset members and reporters presented embarrassing questions. Levi was surprised. "It is foolish to say that I'm working for the GSS," he complained this week to a friend. "Why the GSS? I don't care if the autopsies I perform are on the bodies of Jews or Arabs. I am only a scientist."

Following the overtaking of the number 300 bus, the bodies of four of the terrorists were brought to the pathology institute. Levi received instructions by telephone from the police of Gaza district not to examine the bodies at all, neither by an autopsy nor by external examination. At the Zore'a committee, Levi testified

afterward that in many instances, when deceased Arabs are brought in, he is requested not to perform the autopsy, but this had been the first time that he was asked to not even perform an external examination. In spite of this, Levi conducted an external examination of the corpses. In his opinion regarding the two corpses on which there were no signs of a shooting, he wrote, "The subject, a terrorist, was killed by security forces during the rescue operation of the Egged bus passengers." Following an indication of the exact time, Levi began a description of the terrorist's wounds, and, finally, he expressed his opinion that, based on an external examination alone, the cause of death could not be determined.

Afterward, the Zore'a committee was established and Levi was requested to perform an autopsy on the disintegrated bodies of the terrorists. The two bodies were removed from their graves in the darkness of night and autopsies were performed by Levi and Hiss. They described, in detail, what they found on the corpses and concluded that all damage was the result of wounds inflicted prior to death—from direct or indirect blows from hard objects. Death, the two concluded, was the result of blows to the head.

Following the autopsy, Levi again testified before the committee and, there, determined that the fatal wounds could have been caused by blows from a blunt instrument. The investigators turned to him with a series of questions regarding the types of instruments that could cause the fatal blows. Among other questions, they asked whether a blow from the butt of a revolver could cause the lethal wounds, and he answered in the affirmative. The investigators later switched to questions surrounding the blow that caused the death, and this was Levi's testimony: Regarding the thin terrorist (in the investigation, one was referred to as 'the thin one' and the other as 'the fat one'), one blow (to the head) was 100 percent lethal, and the second fracture was potentially lethal; the fat one received one lethal blow. The wounds that resulted in their deaths were each caused, accordingly, by one blow alone. In the two instances, Levi said to the committee, instantaneous death was not necessarily the case, but they must have lost consciousness for at least a few minutes.

Afterward, the committee showed Levi photographs of the terrorists as they were being taken from the bus and asked him if, at this stage, they could have already received the fatal blows. Regarding the fat one, Levi said in his testimony under oath to the committee, the photograph was taken before he received the fatal blow. Regarding the thin one, he said that he could not determine this with certainty.

Later, doubts were shed on the truth of Levi's testimony. One who shed doubts was, among others, Dr. Levi, himself: Following the Zore'a committee, the Blatmann committee was established, and the head paratroop officer at the time, Brig Gen Yitzhaq Mordekhai, who

was depicted as the main suspect, requested the opinions of different pathologists regarding the fatal blows. Mordekhai turned to Dr. Betzal'el Bloch, who was still head of the institute, and asked his personal opinion. Bloch determined that it was possible that the fatal blows might have been dealt to the terrorists while they were still on the bus and that it was unlikely that the butt of a revolver caused these blows (it may be recalled that a GSS person testified that Mordekhai beat the terrorists with the butt of a revolver). Then, Levi was recalled to testify on the matter, this time before the head of the special investigatory team of the military police, Lt. Col. Yitzhaq Kahana. Nearly a year had passed since he first testified before the Zore'a committee. After they read him Bloch's opinion he said, "I agree with Dr. Bloch in that, because of the decomposition of the brain, it is not possible to determine an exact time of death (of the two terrorists). The estimate that I gave to the Zore'a committee was based upon my classical knowledge...it is not absolute that there would be a loss of consciousness for a specific period of time, and in my testimony before the Zore'a committee my intention was to give them general terms..."

"After I heard the testimonies regarding the circumstances of the thin terrorist," he said, "I estimate that he received the fatal blow in the bus while it was being stormed, and so I agree with the opinion of Dr. Bloch as it has been read to me."

Levi also changed his stand on the subject of the identity of the lethal weapon. Now he no longer felt that the deadly blows were caused by the butt of a revolver—this time he was of the opinion, again like Dr. Bloch, that the fatal blows were caused by the butt of an M-16 rifle. Levi explained the contradiction to his testimony to the Zore'a committee in that then, when he testified before the Zore'a committee, he did not know the full circumstances of the incident, and he did not have available the testimonies of the military personnel who testified that they struck the terrorists on the bus with the butts of rifles.

In any case, the arbitrary nature of Dr Levi's conflicting determinations contradict the caution required in the work of a scientist. The fact that his opinion, retracted by him, so mirrored the testimonies of other witnesses casts a shadow on his professional reliability. Only Professor Avraham Sahar of Tel-Hashomer was consistent in his opinion in the case of the number 300 bus, that the fatal blows were dealt after the terrorists were taken from the bus, and he defined the second possibility as "nonsense." After the GSS scandal was uncovered, it became evident that the professional determinations of Dr. Levi and Dr. Bloch were, indeed, nonsense, and they irresponsibly misled the judicial system. We asked the spokesperson of the Health Ministry, Shmu'el Algarbeli, if an investigation was conducted in the pathology institute to clarify why the two top pathologies misled the investigators. Algarbeli said that he was forbidden to comment.

### The Corpse Does Not Lie

In a new incident, that of 'Awwad Hamdan, difficult questions are again raised. This time, Levi knew that the youth died during the Security Service's interrogation; this time, he was also asked to perform an autopsy on the body. During his exam, he found signs of violence on the corpse, hemorrhages, handcuff marks, and a severe bite on the neck. None of these, in his opinion, were the cause of death. In the autopsy that Levi conducted, he could not find the cause of death. He sent tissue samples from all parts of the body to the toxicology lab to check for evidence of poisons and contamination in the body. After receiving their findings, he found indications of pneumonia and determined the cause of death. He presented his findings to seven physicians, among them Professor Bobis, the chief pathologist at Tel-Hashomer. In consultation with the physicians, there was no difference of opinion regarding the finding of pneumonia. But they did differ in determining whether the disease caused the death of the prisoner.

Levi was pressed. To his colleagues he explains that the findings are, indeed, findings, but that the rest was a matter of interpretation, and that it was understandable for there to be a difference of opinion regarding the cause of death. Another angle arises from the words of another of the pathologists, who participated in the consultation, to KOTERET RASHIT, "What is happening today surpasses all bounds when they say that it is impossible to believe us anymore. The corpse never lies; it makes no mistakes. The problem is to understand its language. If you understand it, you have solved the problem; if you don't understand, you have a problem, but it is impossible to deceive much here. The room for differentiation is minimal. But, there are physicians who believe that they must provide a service to the government and there are physicians who feel that the government must provide services to science. And that's the entire difference."

In one instance, in an investigation of an accident in the IDF, the forensic physician in charge of the case determined a certain finding. Dr. Yehudah [Hiss], who challenged the leadership of the pathology institute, did not agree with him and gave, on his own initiative, a contradicting opinion. He was severely rebuked by the Health Department. It is forbidden for a physician working for the State, they wrote him, to give an opinion that is in opposition to the institution for which he works.

### Lack of Knowledge, Lack of Understanding

The majority of work in the pathology institute is in the field of criminal law, and its physicians appear as court witnesses. Here, too, as in the testimonies of the GSS personnel in small claims, the judges always trusted their opinion and tended to accept it virtually automatically. The defense, for some reason, is not given access to the pathology institute, except by a special writ from the

court. Lately, however, the standing of the institute has taken a turn for the worse in the courts. In Tel-Aviv's district court, the case of Shlomo Haliwah, accused of the rape and murder of the soldier Orli Dovi, is now becoming clear. The pathological opinion is critical in this case for determining the date of death. Dovi disappeared on Nov. 15, and her body was discovered on Dec. 14. Haliwah was out on a pass from prison and returned on Nov. 16. Upon discovery of the body, Dr. Levi was summoned, and he examined her and submitted an opinion. He wrote that death occurred from 21 to 30 days prior to her discovery. In court he stated that, in his opinion, death occurred closer to 30 days rather than 21, but pointed out that it is impossible to unequivocally determine a date of death. Haliwah's defense attorney, Shimon Shuvar, called as an expert witness Prof. Bobis. Bobis stated that, in the western world, it is already known how to determine this by the life cycle of flies. A fly has an exact life cycle: 48 hours after its appearance it lays an egg, and within a definitive amount of time a maggot develops; afterward, again within a definitive amount of time, it becomes a larva and then a fly. From Levi's testimony it further became evident that he did not preserve the findings and did not conduct the examinations referred to by the defense. This was not necessary, he said in the investigation.

Since this case also deals with rape, the serology lab also plays a key role. At the head of the lab is Dr. Vera Chachik, an emigrant from the USSR. On one of the doors leading to her lab in the institute hangs an eye-catching and somewhat surprising sign that reads 'Life Department.' Here, Chachik conducts her tests (sperm, hair, etc.) on the accused and their clothing.

Chachik also conducted tests in the case of Haliwah and wrote her opinion. To oppose her, the defense brought an expert witness, Dr. Gerry Orlin, head of the blood bank at Hasharon Hospital, a new immigrant from the United States who completed his studies at Yale University. "In my opinion, the methods employed at the serology lab in the Institute for Forensic Medicine," wrote Dr. Orlin, "shed doubts upon the ability of the institute to furnish the court with reliable answers that can be depended on..." Orlin determined that Chachik does not use materials properly as a matter of course; during a visit that he arranged at her laboratory, by a court writ, he discovered that she retained materials whose expiration date had passed many months earlier and that she used regular, outdated, household refrigerators without a thermostat, in spite of the fact that on each of the materials it is explicitly indicated at what temperature they must be stored. In Orlin's opinion Chachik also does not know how to read directions, which are written in English. She also does not conduct the blood tests as they should be, not even in accordance with the procedures of the Health Department, Orlin determined. If the blood types were to be determined by Chachik's methods, Orlin indicated, they could cause the deaths of those who are ill. "Here, we are speaking of a definite lack of understanding and a lack of knowledge."

From the opposing investigation in this incident, a shaky picture is formed. Chachik said in her testimony that she does not need a thermostat in the refrigerators, because she knows that they're all right. To attorney Shovar's question of how she knew this, she replied: "they make ice and they don't leak." She further testified that she always stores the materials in the only refrigerator that is hooked up to a generator, so that a blackout could not damage them. It later became evident that Orlin found, during his visit, that the materials were actually stored in the second refrigerator, which is not hooked up to the generator. "They were there once," admitted Chachik, after some wriggling. "Now, I keep them in the other one."

Following her testimony, Shovar asked the court to appoint a neutral examiner to check the conditions in the laboratory, as well as Chachik's education and qualifications. His request was denied.

In another case, which was concluded about a year ago in Be'er Sheva', a man accused of murder was acquitted at the request of the prosecution, after the pathology witnesses were refuted. Here, too, Chachik played a central role, and Dr. Daniel Philips, the deputy of the institute, starred with her. Attorney Ya'akov Geser, the defense attorney for the accused in the murder, Zorik Dyodov, invited Professor Karplus, who had been head of the Institute for Forensic Medicine for 19 years (prior to Dr. Bloch), to examine the findings. Karplus contradicted Philips' findings, one by one. To Philips' credit, it should be said that she did not cling to her view, but elected to accept Karplus' position.

At the scene of the murder, under the murdered body, a stocking-cap with two holes for the eyes was found. Eighteen days after Dyodov's arrest, a policeman came to Chachik, who had possession of the cap, in order to conduct examinations, and found two hairs in it. He brought Chachik hair samples of the accused and asked her to compare the two. She conducted a microscopic comparison and found the two to be identical. In her testimony, she stated that these tests are 90 percent accurate. In an opposing investigation, it became evident that more accurate tests are currently available, based on a factorization of the hair, and the microscopic test is no longer used, since it is considered unreliable. The question also arose, why didn't Chachik herself remove the hairs from the cap. To the defense attorney's question, why didn't she, rather than the policeman, remove them, she replied, "Perhaps the police do not trust me." Following her testimony, the prosecutor asked to acquit Dyodov, and after a month the other accused man was also acquitted. Chachik also testified in the case of Hava Ya'ari regarding hair, testimony that was totally refuted by an expert from the police laboratory for criminal identification.

What is happening in the pathology institute? The Health Department has refused to participate in preparation of the article—it did not permit a tour and did not

arrange interviews with the doctors. Whoever did agree to talk did so anonymously. One doctor defended the means available to the institute. "There is not enough money," he said. "We are 'stepchildren' who do not contribute to the Health Department, but, rather, provide a service to the police and GSS. Therefore, there are problems. We need a good library and modernized laboratories; we don't have a computer or an electronic microscope; we have to send people to seminars to stay up to date. This would improve the performance of the institute immeasurably."

Another physician said, in contradiction to this, that the institute had modern facilities available to it and does not lack a thing: it is a high-level institute.

Why, therefore, are such serious mistakes occurring? The State Attorney is not free of blame. That office regularly works with the institute, depends on its opinion, and is well informed of the situation, but does nothing. But it is the Health Department that is responsible for the institute. The health service is going to announce this week the start of an investigation into the involvement of the pathology institute in the 'Awwad Hamdan affair. It should be assumed that the investigation will also touch on the other cases connected with the institute.

13438

**Spy RPV Converted for Civilian Uses**  
44230010 Tel Aviv DAVAR 24 Feb 88 p 6

[Article by Amir Rosenblit; "Civilian Conversion"]

[Text] The remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), which the Israeli Defense Forces use principally in the intelligence field, is currently being converted for civilian use. In the initial stage it is likely to be exploited for discovering uranium and metallic minerals. At present, efforts are being made in its development by Dr. Hovev Tzafrir, the director of the department for applied field research in the Center for Nuclear Research at Nahal-Soreq and Dr. Gid'on Steinmetz from the Geological Institute in Jerusalem. The two men presented their plan for conversion of the military RPV for civilian service at an international conference for mineral exploration held recently in Toronto. The experts who participated in this event remarked that the RPV is the technological method of the future in this area. After enthusiastic responses which they received at the conference, the two men decided to develop a prototype of the Israeli RPV's to be used for detecting uranium and metallic minerals. They intend to manufacture and market them within about a year and a half. The cost of the project is estimated between \$5 and \$10 million. This week the two researchers presented the project at the annual conference of the Israeli Geological Society which was held at the Galey Zohar hotel on the Dead Sea. With the development of the prototype, the RPV is likely to reduce survey costs.

**JORDAN**

**Health Minister Emphasizes Medical Cooperation With Syria**

44040118 Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
12 Feb 88 p 5

[Interview with Dr Zayd Hamzah, Jordan's Minister of Health, by Ahmad Bubas: "Jordan's Minister of Health Visits a Number of Hospitals, Tells AL-THAWRAH, 'There is Close Cooperation Between Syria and Jordan in Various Areas of Health; Syria Should Be proud of Its Medical Institutions';" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Dr Zayd Hamzah, Jordan's minister of health and chairman of the Arab Council for Medical Specialties is visiting Syria at the present time. His visit is another step that is being taken to strengthen cooperation in the medical profession between the two fraternal countries, Syria and Jordan.

To put the spotlight on the minister's visit and on the goals that are being sought by it, AL-THAWRAH conducted the following interview with Dr Zayd Hamzah, Jordan's minister of health. AL-THAWRAH wanted to find out the impressions of the visiting Jordanian minister.

[Question] Your excellency, your visit to the Syrian Arab Republic undoubtedly represents one aspect of the close relations between the two fraternal countries of Jordan and Syria. It manifests the cooperation that exists in the medical field between the ministries of health in both countries. What is the nature of your current visit to Syria, and what are the goals that are being sought by it?

[Answer] I am visiting Syria at the generous invitation of the Syrian government and of my colleague, Dr Iyad al-Shatti, Syria's minister of health. The invitation was extended to strengthen relations between the two countries, particularly in the area of medicine. I came to find out about the progress which has been made in Syria in the area of medical services and, accordingly, to benefit from it. I came to tell our Syrian colleagues about our experience in Jordan so that we may cooperate with each other and coordinate and integrate our activities in numerous areas. In addition, there is the matter of the Arab Council for Medical Specialties. I am the chairman of its board, and my colleague, Syria's minister of health, is the treasurer.

[Question] What subjects did you discuss in your talks with the minister of health in Syria?

[Answer] This morning, Wednesday, we started the talks in a session at the Syrian Ministry of Health. These talks were fraternal, candid, and open. His excellency the minister of health briefed us on Syria's new experience

with regulating drugs. We also talked about organizing health administration in the two countries, and we presented to our colleagues Jordan's experience in that area.

In the following sessions we will discuss those items which can be amended and changed in the agreement between the two countries. This agreement, which has been in existence for 13 years, needs to be reconsidered so that it can become compatible with the development of relations between Syria and Jordan and the development of medical services in the two countries. Other agreements can also be reached. For example, it would be possible to have an agreement allowing each country to supplement the other's drug needs. A barter system can be utilized to allow each country to trade drugs with the other.

[Question] You were briefed on Syria's new drug policy during your visit to Syria. What is your evaluation of that policy?

[Answer] I was briefed on Syria's new experiment in regulating drugs. It is an experiment that bodes well and promises success, especially because it relies on a scientific, not a commercial classification of drugs. It employed, primarily, a list of basic drugs which was drawn up by the World Health Organization [WHO]. Syria then made changes and additions to that list which were compatible with its own circumstances. And, of course, Jordan's experience in the area of drugs has been different. Problems in that area in particular are also different, but the list which was prepared by Syria's Ministry of Health will most certainly be the object of our consideration. We who are in Jordan's Ministry of Health in particular, not in the private sector, can benefit from that list.

We also found there was a common tendency to apply to pharmacists a system of professional wages rather than one of commercial profit, which is being followed now. That system gives a pharmacist a percentage of the cost of each drug. In that regard we started implementing this system in Jordan with the assistance of the WHO. When this study is completed, our fellow Syrians will be briefed on it so they can benefit from it.

[Question] Your excellency, you spoke about Jordan's experience in organizing health administration. Can you give us details now about this experience?

[Answer] We presented to our colleagues the experience that Jordan has had with an integrated medical system as sanctioned by the WHO in the 1978 al-Ma'atah Declaration. That declaration defined a strategy that countries of the world can follow to achieve the goal of health for everyone by the year 2000. This goal can be achieved by means of primary and then secondary health care.

In Jordan we've divided the kingdom into health districts, and each district can provide its own primary and secondary health care services. In other words, each district has an adequate number of health centers which provide all the well-known, invariable primary health care services which in the past were called preventive medicine. These services include immunizing children against childhood diseases; providing maternity and infant care; school health; water control to ensure that water is fit to drink; sanitary drainage; food control; control of contagious and communicable diseases; health education; making basic drugs available; and treating common diseases, accidents, and emergencies. These activities cover more than 95 percent of the cases which are referred to our health centers. The remaining cases, which make up less than five percent of the total cases, are referred to district or regional hospitals. Thus, each district can take care of all but 0.4 percent of its medical services needs, and those are referred to specialist hospitals.

[Question] The business activities of the Arab Council for Medical Specialties, whose headquarters are in Damascus, must have taken up much of your time during your visit to Damascus. Can you tell us something about that?

[Answer] As chairman of the Arab Council for Medical Specialties I visited the council's offices in the company of my colleague, Syria's minister of health. It is known that the council's office, which is in Damascus, is being embraced by the Syrian government under instructions from His Excellency President Hafiz al-Asad to confirm the national implication of cooperation in that area. We examined conditions at the council as we had promised our colleagues we would do at the emergency board meeting which was held in Bahrain two months ago. His excellency Syria's minister of health, who also serves as treasurer of the council, and I will make every possible effort to maintain the council's course and to develop its activities so they can be equal and comparable to similar international councils. In Jordan as in Syria we have the competent people who can help us achieve that goal. We have therefore decided in Jordan to set up a liaison office that will be affiliated with my office there. This office will function as liaison between me and the permanent headquarters in Damascus.

[Question] You have visited numerous medical institutions during your visit to Syria. What are your impressions about them?

[Answer] I visited the Center for Nuclear Medicine on the second day of my visit to Syria. Actually, the impression I got about this center was an excellent one, and Syria should be proud of it. I found out that there was much there which we can benefit from. In this regard we will organize an exchange program for physicians in Syria and Jordan, and instead of inviting foreign experts to the center we have in Jordan, which is similar to yours, we can benefit from your expertise in that area.

I also visited the Institute of Medicine, which is similar to the one we have in Jordan. We examined the progress which was achieved there in teaching students the supporting medical professions. We found out from this visit that in Jordan we do not have a department for teaching medical equipment maintenance. That department which exists now at the Damascus Institute will be useful to us. We will also support our Syrian colleagues' request that this branch become a regional center to be sponsored by the WHO. We will also offer our colleagues at the institute our experience in teaching medical statistics and medical records, two subjects which are not available in Damascus.

08592

### **Critical Unemployment Among Engineers Shapes Union Elections**

44040129 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic

24 Feb 88 p 5

[Article by Jamal al-'Alawi: "AL-DUSTUR Continues Dialogue With Candidates for Engineers Elections; al-Kaylani and Shubaylat Among Strongest Candidates for Post of Union Chairman; Next Council's Tasks Are to Safeguard Gains and Solve Unemployment Problem"]

[Text] On Friday, the day after tomorrow, 5,000 male and female engineers will head for the engineering professions complex in Amman and to the polling stations in Irbid, al-Karak and Ma'an to select a union chairman, vice chairman and union council for the next term.

Now that 'Awni al-Sakit has withdrawn his candidacy, it seems that the competition for union chairmanship will be between candidates Muhammad Khayr al-Kaylani and Layth al-Shubaylat.

Today will witness further withdrawals from candidacy for the positions of union chairman and vice chairman. Competition for the position of vice chairman will be between the following five candidates: Husni abu-Ghayda, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Bitar, Jamal al-Shakhshir, Isma'il Baryush and Mahir al-Nimri.

To make a contribution to the election process, AL-DUSTUR continues its dialogue with the candidates and welcomes the opinions of the candidates whom it failed to contact.

### **Engineer Layth al-Shubaylat**

Engineer Layth al-Shubaylat said: The professional unions generally, and our union in particular, are undergoing difficult fateful circumstances, with their membership growing incredibly. The standard of the profession is facing pressures and danger and the unemployment problem has been intensifying and continues to intensify under the country's and area's previous and current economic circumstances. These special problems and the

other regular problems can be confronted only by unifying our efforts against the danger threatening our union and by changing our approach, beginning with rearranging the priorities on whose basis the union leaders are selected and ending with the daily management of the union's activities and affairs. Therefore, I have found it my duty, on the basis of my understanding of the dictates of this phase, to change the ordinary election approach and to run as the candidate of all for the post of chairman and as a symbol of consolidated unionist efforts in this fateful phase—a candidate who heads a leadership that builds bridges of trust with all the parties concerned to create a better climate for serious and ceaseless action which enables the union to achieve its goals.

### **Unemployment**

Al-Shubaylat pointed out that the engineers' unemployment problem is part of the general unemployment problem which, in turn, is a part of the country's economic problem. In addition to the ordinary solutions which the candidates promise to the voters, promises such as seeking to place an engineer in every department and local or foreign firm and other similar promises, we have to demand and to contribute to the creation of local production complexes through cooperatives whose members participate directly in productive work and which turn out products that benefit the members and their country. The country derives direct benefit from such complexes through the products they turn out and indirect benefits through reduced foreign labor. I believe that the union has a role to play in this connection. This role begins with a pioneer project in which a group of members participate and which offers a model to be emulated by other projects to be set up by other members and to attract other resources from the government. The citizen engineer who realizes that the foreign debt volume amounts to \$1,700 per capita must also realize that if he does not demand and does not personally initiate a change in his life style, turning it into a productive pattern free of the manifestations of consumerism, then he will end up harming his country. The engineers, who are always in the vanguard, shoulder a major role in leading such a change.

At a time when contractors engage in their trade under regulations established by an integral union, it has become unreasonable for the engineering consultation firms to continue operating through unionist and higher committees. The union must rapidly reorganize consulting activities by creating a higher authority that takes charge of this activity under the union's umbrella.

As for the training and retraining of engineers, one of the reasons for unemployment is the absence of engineers qualified for specific tasks while surplus numbers of engineers are available for other kinds of tasks. The union must help the engineers retrain and adjust to these

changes through scientific and technological courses that enable the engineers to gain new skills and expertise and allow them to fill the vacancies where engineers are needed.

Al-Shubaylat added that regulating the method of the investment decision-making is important and vital in light of rapid changes. The council must form a mini-committee that meets daily to observe the indicators and changes in the financial markets and that makes emergency recommendations to emergency council meetings so that the council may make the proper decisions. As for other investments, serious studies are needed to create opportunities to invest monies in businesses that yield benefits to the members. Moreover, investment in backing housing projects for the union members yields good unionist and social results, in addition to yielding a secure financial return to the union's fund.

Bolstering the uprising and steadfastness against the enemy is a fateful national duty. The union must mobilize all its efforts and capabilities to achieve this end.

#### **Engineer Husni Abu-Ghayda**

Engineer Husni Abu-Ghayda, the independent Unionist Action Grouping's candidate for the post of vice chairman, said: The unions' vanguard action must emanate from a sound unionist base with a strong and firm structure, especially in this climate of profound national awareness in which we live and with which we interact in the context of the magnificent uprising in the occupied homeland.

He added: We appreciate the efforts made by the colleagues in the union's former councils and we believe that it is possible to achieve more of the objectives to which the engineers aspire. These goals have been crystallized through the election of the engineering councils, including the Applied Engineering Branch which will have a representative in the union council as of the start of this term.

Engineer Abu-Ghayda also said: One of the most significant problems encountered by engineers in this phase is the problem of real and hidden unemployment which was not viewed with adequate seriousness when raised in the previous general assemblies in past years. This problem has now become a reality that requires us to seek the means to control its effects and to put and end to it among engineering circles.

He urged the need to open new opportunities for engineers, especially newly-graduated engineers who are the hope of this nation's future. He also urged the need to safeguard the gains made by engineers and to work with all the means available to enhance these gains and to take seriously any violation of the rights of engineers in both the public and private sectors. This requires expanding the base of participation between the engineers and the union and between the union and society.

Regarding the tasks facing the next council, he said: All efforts must be united to help the next council and to encourage it to achieve the engineers' aspirations and to curtail the professional hardship facing the engineering sector.

#### **Engineer Jamal al-Shakhshir**

Engineer Jamal al-Shakhshir, an independent candidate for the post of vice chairman, talked about tackling the unemployment problem, saying: Article 31 of the 1985 law requiring partial and total [engineering] supervision [over construction work] must be strictly applied. A law must also be issued requiring business owners to observe the supervision restrictions by submitting guarantees and by applying the engineering work ceilings in the various fields.

Engineer al-Shakhshir also stressed the need to urge the government to link the development plans to the universities and to set the number of graduates from the various engineering disciplines according to the country's need.

He further noted the need for the union to cooperate with the government to create new work opportunities in sisterly Arab countries and to safeguard the gains the engineers have made in the areas of salaries, specialization allowances and technical allowances because these allowances are a right to which engineers are entitled in return for the work they do.

#### **Engineer Isma'il Baryush**

Engineer Isma'il Baryush, candidate for the post of vice chairman in the professional work list, said: The Engineers Union is an important pillar of unionist and vocational activity by virtue of the fact that it is the union with the largest number of members.

He noted that the engineers have made accomplishments and gains in the areas of work, social and health insurance and pension. But Jordan's and the area's economic crisis has helped create the unemployment phenomenon and this has led to the emergence of ideas calling for curtailing the engineers' benefits. This condition requires the union to exert major efforts to preserve and develop the gained rights and to demand the adoption of an economic policy founded on developing the production sectors and bolstering the national industries in order to create new work opportunities and to contribute to building the national economy on a firm foundation.

#### **Engineer Musa 'Abbasi**

Engineer Musa 'Abbasi, the Civilian Branch's candidate for the union council membership, said: The fundamental tasks are the tasks of solving the problem of unemployment among engineers. This problem cannot be separated from the general unemployment crisis and must be tackled on a national basis.

He pointed out that the Engineers Union has conducted numerous studies to determine the problem's dimensions, the nature of the labor market and this market's connection with Jordan's employment and educational policy, noting the need to exert efforts to create new work opportunities and to replace foreign engineering expertise in the areas of engineering consultation and contracts with national expertise by improving the terms of national agreements in favor of Jordanian engineers.

#### Engineer Riyad Abu-Hazim

Engineer Riyad Abu-Hazim, the Chemical Branch's candidate for the union council membership, touched on the importance of establishing a law for practicing the chemical engineering profession in order to contribute to solving the problem of unemployment among chemical engineers because such a law will very simply require the production plants to employ engineers. Such employment will reflect positively on production and on plant owners.

Engineer Abu-Hazim noted that the 1970's witnessed gains because of supply and demand, need and economic conditions.

08494

### LEBANON

#### Al-Turk Discusses Soviet Initiative, Resolution 242, Visit to Iran

44040113 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
12 Feb 88 pp 18-19

[Interview with Ambassador Fu'ad al-Turk, secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by William Dahir: "Fu'ad al-Turk Tells AL-HAWADITH, 'I Am a Civil Servant, and Lebanon Is My Employer; What Concerns Us about Resolution 242 Is the Palestinian Presence and Its Future; Truce Agreement Is Only Thing To Determine Security Arrangements with Israel';" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Ambassador Fu'ad al-Turk, secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a professional diplomat and a wise politician. He has become well-known for his moderation and patriotism, and that has earned him the confidence of all parties in Lebanon. He is accepted by everyone and rejected by no one. That is why his name is always mentioned in discussions held by political clubs whenever anything is said about the need for someone who is appreciated by all activists and parties to assume a responsibility.

AL-HAWADITH interviewed Fu'ad al-Turk, and the text of that interview follows:

[Question] What do you think about the Soviet initiative which calls upon the Security Council to convene to look into the matter of an international peace conference in

the Middle East? If such a conference were to be held and if it were to succeed, to what extent will its success have an effect on the quest for a solution in Lebanon?

[Answer] The initiative is very important of course. Consequently, we are watching reactions to it. We are not concerned about the Security Council convening because Lebanon is not a member of the council. But we are undoubtedly interested in the event because of the effects it will have on the region and on us. Lebanon's official position on this matter would be expressed by the president after due consultations with Prime Minister al-Huss. Speaking from a purely personal standpoint, however, I believe that convening a meeting of the Security Council is a welcome action because anything that can be done and anything that would help set things in motion and, eventually, solve the problem of the Middle East, will, in my opinion, have a positive effect on Lebanon.

We know that one part of the problem in Lebanon stems from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The presence of half a million Palestinians in Lebanon is the result of that problem. Lebanon is interested, first of all, in the establishment of peace in the region so that the region can regain its normal status and the countries of the region can devote themselves to other matters that would benefit their peoples and bring about good things for all humanity. In Lebanon we are also interested in what will happen to half a million Palestinians who are living on our land. We want them to go back to their country and regain their legitimate rights. That is generally what we want. So far, of course, neither the U.S. nor the Israeli position is clear with regard to each country's reaction to the Soviet initiative. But we are watching this matter with care and interest. Naturally, we will be taking the steps that we think are suitable to Lebanon's supreme interests in light of developments and new occurrences.

[Question] Can it be said then that Lebanon has not yet formulated an official position on the Soviet initiative, or has that position been formulated? Has the direction you will be following become clear?

[Answer] Lebanon's official position was reported then to Mr de Cuellar, UN secretary general. This was done before the Soviet Union called for a meeting of the Security Council. That position is the same one which was expressed by the president, by the speaker of the parliament, and by the prime minister. It was relayed to Mr Golding, Mr de Cuellar's representative, when he came to Beirut, and it is based on five points:

First, the principle of participating in the international peace conference is to be accepted.

Second, Lebanon has no territory to negotiate, and that is a fact. The International Conference for Peace in the Middle East will revolve around Resolution 242 which came out in 1967. At that time Lebanon had no occupied territory. Resolution 242 then would apply to those

countries whose land was occupied in 1967. But there is a paragraph in that resolution which has to do with the future of Palestinians on Lebanese territory. We are therefore especially concerned with that paragraph of the resolution. We think the question of the Middle East can be settled by means of Resolution 242, and the question of Lebanon can be settled by Resolution 425 which was issued in 1978.

Third, consequently and for the reason I mentioned, our presence at the conference must in no way signify that the question of Lebanon is to be linked with that of the Middle East.

Fourth, the settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon is to be rejected. Rejection of that settlement has been agreed upon: it is not only a Lebanese decision, but it is also a Palestinian decision. The question of Palestine is the question of the Palestinian people. If the Palestinian people who live outside Palestine stay out of Palestine, that will be the end of that case. That is why Palestinians who are living outside Palestine must be given the opportunity to regain their legitimate rights.

Fifth, Lebanon is clinging to the truce agreement until the conference is convened and another truce agreement replaces the existing one after the conference.

[Question] To date Lebanon has carried out repeated attempts to implement Resolution 425 and various other UN resolutions which have to do with Israel's withdrawal from its territory. Can you tell us what obstacles are interfering with the implementation of these resolutions?

[Answer] Resolution 425 was issued in 1978, and that is almost over 9 years ago. To date, however, the resolution has not been implemented despite efforts which have been made in that regard by us and by other parties.

At a recent meeting held by the two parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and defense, the recommendation was made that parliament ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make preparations for convening a special session of the UN Security Council to deliberate on ways for implementing Resolution 425. The parliamentary committee on foreign affairs and the one on defense also decided to call for a special joint session to be attended by officials in the army and others who are involved in some way with this matter. These officials would deliberate upon the matter of defining responsibilities which have to do with the army in case the Israelis withdraw and Resolution 425 is implemented. The two parliamentary committees will also meet soon to consider the responsibility they have to bear in the course of implementing this resolution and sending the army to South Lebanon. But at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we will make contacts and take actions in accordance with the parliamentary committees' recommendation on foreign affairs and defense. We will be

engaged in exploratory actions or in a thorough examination of the [possibility of] implementing Resolution 425. On my part I will make the necessary contacts to bring about that goal. This process, of course, is not as easy as some people think it is. As we know, the Israeli and American position on the matter of south Lebanon and on Israel's withdrawal is to demand security arrangements or security measures. And we have stated more than once that the truce agreement made between the two countries in 1949 was the only framework under which any matter between Lebanon and Israel can be considered. It is known that Resolution 509 stipulated an unconditional withdrawal from Lebanese territory.

[Question] When will you start making the contacts that you spoke of?

[Answer] We have already started, and we will continue. I keep Prime Minister al-Huss and the president informed about them as they occur.

[Question] How can Resolution 425 be implemented as long as Israel and the United States insist on security arrangements while Lebanon, on the other hand, insists on the truce agreement? Don't you believe that if Lebanon were to go to the Security Council demanding the implementation of the resolution, its demand will be vetoed by the United States as usual?

[Answer] First of all, we do not turn to the council to consider there the implementation of Resolution 425 if we are not sure of the outcome. This is not a matter of filing a complaint. In this case we are taking a practical step to do something concrete.

As far as the truce agreement is concerned, it is an agreement between Lebanon and Israel which has to do with security arrangements. This means that we can do anything in the context of the truce agreement to broaden or change it. There are provisions in the truce agreement for modifying it. That is why we are saying that the goal which is being sought can be achieved within the truce agreement. This is Lebanon's official position. However, if something can be done through the United Nations to end the Israeli occupation and establish the state's control over every inch of the country, that idea too can be examined at length.

[Question] Media correspondents have reported that President Amin al-Jumayyil did not object to Ambassador Fu'ad al-Turk, a Catholic, becoming president of Lebanon. Those statements coincided with your nomination by politicians for the position of minister of foreign affairs in any government that might be formed in Lebanon. Does this have anything to do with the fact that the decree appointing you ambassador in Paris has been delayed? What does the title, Your Excellency, Mr President, or the title, Your Excellency, Mr Minister, mean to you?

[Answer] I can only express much gratitude and sincere appreciation for the confidence, affection, and emotion with which I am surrounded. These are great assets that I cherish. Regarding the matter you are referring to, however, you know and everyone knows that since I've been working as a public servant I have not been involved in politics.

[Question] The fact that you were nominated for these positions may reflect the appreciation which is felt for the efforts you made to re-establish relations between politicians and the government during the days of the rift. Your nomination may have been an expression of appreciation for the course you took and the role you played to maintain and preserve the unity of Lebanon's diplomatic corps from the time you took over the position of secretary general at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What do you think about that?

[Answer] I am proud of the fact that I was able to do that, but I did not do it alone. Every administrative employee and everyone in the diplomatic corps in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inside the country and abroad did his part. It is thanks to all of them that we were able to preserve the unity of Lebanon's diplomatic corps and the integrity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' mission and role. I am also proud of the fact that this ministry has continued to serve as a safety valve, reflecting the conscience of Lebanon and the Lebanese people. If we can say that we were able to achieve that, and that is the most important function of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is because we all adopted a motto that is known to all the Lebanese. That motto is, "I am a civil servant, and Lebanon is my employer." We are also conscious of the sensitive and delicate responsibility we bear. What we do at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reflected on Lebanon's reputation and its image abroad and at international forums. It is that which places this responsibility on our shoulders, particularly under the conditions which our country is going through. You can imagine what the reaction of the international community might be when we ask, for example, for assistance and support for our causes when we ourselves remain divided in our opinions and positions and do not see eye to eye on crucial matters.

[Question] We do not yet know if your appointment as Lebanon's ambassador to Paris is still imminent. French authorities have questions about the reasons why your presence at the embassy there has been delayed, especially after you were officially notified by France while you were en route to New York via Paris of that country's approval of your nomination as Lebanon's ambassador in Paris.

[Answer] All I can say about this matter is that all measures which have to do with this appointment have been completed: the French state has approved it, and all the preparatory stages and steps for the decree containing this appointment have been completed. The decree is in its final stages now at the presidential palace.

[Question] There is in fact some turmoil over the departure of al-Amir Faruq Abu al-Lama' from the embassy in Paris. Some people say he resigned his position as ambassador, and others say he did not. Those who are saying he did not resign claim that he was transferred to the central administration so he can make preparations for the presidential elections. This was done after an official announcement was made that he was a candidate for that position. What is the true story here?

[Answer] I can affirm that Ambassador Abu al-Lama' did not resign. Last June, however, he requested a transfer from Lebanon's Embassy in Paris to the central administration, and his request was granted. The bill transferring Ambassador Abu al-Lama' is also in the presidential palace, and all legal measures for it have been completed.

[Question] Several Arab countries restored diplomatic relations with Egypt after the Amman Summit. Is Lebanon inclined to restore its diplomatic relations with the Cairo government?

[Answer] The restoration of relations between Lebanon and Egypt must be done in the same way relations between the two countries were broken. Since it was Lebanon's Council of Ministers that broke relations, it is the Council of Ministers that has to decide to restore them. Because of the well-known situation in which the government finds itself, nothing yet has been decided on that matter.

[Question] You will be visiting Iran soon. What are the objectives and the hidden agenda for this visit? How was it arranged, and what do you expect from it?

[Answer] I intend to visit Iran this month as a result of an invitation I received from my Iranian counterpart. In the coming days we will agree on an agenda and a date for this visit. I hope that I will have the opportunity, first of all, to meet the many friends I made and left there when I was ambassador to Iran between late 1978 and early 1982. Second, I hope there will be an opportunity to consider with Iranian officials ways for developing and shaping bilateral relations between Lebanon and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The two countries do, of course, have many issues to discuss. But as I said, what we can do to develop these relations during this visit remains to be seen.

[Question] But it has been noticed that this is the first visit to Iran by a Lebanese official. What do you expect from it?

[Answer] All I can say is that I am hoping for positive results. The visit stems from the desire which the two parties have to consider everything that might help bring them closer together.

[Question] Did the visit which the charge d'affaires at the Iranian Embassy make to you last week have anything to do with this matter?

[Answer] I can say that the charge d'affaires visited me so we can consider together the matter of my visit to Tehran. We also considered a few matters which have to do with the embassy in Lebanon. That is, we considered matters between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy.

[Question] But the American newspaper, THE NEW YORK TIMES, reported that the charge d'affaires at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, 'Ali Asghar Muhamadiyah, informed you that releasing the foreign hostages who are being held in Lebanon would definitely depend upon the end of the Iraq-Iran War. That aroused concern in the countries which have hostages who are being held in Lebanon by supporters of Iran. What did the Iranian diplomat tell you about the hostages?

[Answer] I can affirm that the matter of the hostages was not discussed at the meeting you are referring to.

[Question] As the date for constitutional elections approaches, much is being said about candidates who can settle the crisis and candidates who can manage it. How do you see the next president?

[Answer] I personally do not subscribe to this prevalent saying. That is, I do not divide the candidates into candidates who can manage the crisis and others who can settle it. I believe that a president has to be a president in every sense of the word or not at all. The president must be a virtuous president. He is to act in light of the given facts which are available to him when he deals with events. If he finds that he has to manage them, then he should do just that, and if there is an opportunity for a solution, he should work for one. This means that he must be ready and open to deal with both possibilities.

08592

**Economic Crisis, Distribution of Saudi Aid**  
**Described MORNING, 25-31 Jan 88]**  
*44000047b Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English*  
*25-31 Jan 88 pp 10-11*

[Text] Distribution of aid started in West Beirut and will be followed up in all the Lebanese regions, said Mr Fadel Shalak. No problems or obstacles were faced, due to coordination of activities with all the associations, he added.

Mr Shalak, the chairman of the Board of Directors of Hariri Foundation told MONDAY MORNING he was ready to cooperate with anyone willing to help the Lebanese people, but in principle, he is fulfilling the projects of Saudi Arabia, which has already rendered donations to Lebanon, and will continue to do so.

He did not answer questions on the formation of a new cabinet or on the presidential election. He described the economic situation and the daily-living conditions as very bad, and as, in need of a political solution. "We are transformed into begging people," he noted, "but those who object to begging, should first object to the civil war, which is the major problem of the people," he added. However Shalak extended his deep thanks to the Saudi monarch for his esteemed donation which left a wonderful echo among the Lebanese people.

Here is the translation of the interview, which was conducted in Arabic:

[Question] Where has the issue of the distribution on aid in Lebanon reached, and what are the measures that you started with?

[Answer] We started in West Beirut in a number of tests, first of which is that Beirut is the capital and the core of the subject. Second: you cannot start in all the regions at once, from the organizational point of view. We have adopted a method in distribution that is unique, in the sense that it was based on two principles:

1) Everybody shared in the various stages of distribution, i.e. in planning, decision and implementation.

2) All the shares were delivered to the public on the basis of our confidence in the people. Those who were not in need, expressed their thanks and did not receive an assistance. This method succeeded and the response was felt by the clubs and associations who contributed volunteers and who participated efficiently on a very high level.

Everybody in West Beirut, whether Sunnites, Shiites, Druzes and Christians, participated in the distribution, delivering all the shares to the public. Thus, we were able to implement the wish of the Saudi monarch who insisted on having a just and a comprehensive distribution to all. We shall apply this method to all regions in Lebanon, without amendment, unless those responsible for this gift find it necessary to do so.

[Question] What are the problems that you face?

[Answer] There are minor problems that result from misunderstanding. In West Beirut, we did not face problems or obstacles, work went on smoothly and naturally. The people responded to us and welcomed us. They were grateful for the gift and for the donor. The staff that were working with us found pleasure in their work, and felt that they were among the members of the foundation.

[Question] Who is the person or the group who set this plan and led to its success, within the Hariri Foundation?

[Answer] We coordinated the activities of all the associations.

[Question] Other countries think of helping the Lebanese but hesitate in fear of the fact that the aid may not reach those concerned. Will the foundation of Sheikh Rafik Hariri in Lebanon, which you chair, cooperate with other, or present the program that you are adopting, in order to apply it in their distribution?

[Answer] We are ready to cooperate with everybody, but we are fulfilling the wishes and projects of Saudi Arabia in this respect, for a basic reason, namely that Saudi Arabia is the most generous country which donates for Lebanon so far.

[Question] Where will the following plans be?

[Answer] The southern suburbs. We met with associations in the southern suburb, and were welcomed. The associations expressed their desire to apply the same method that was applied in West Beirut.

[Question] And the following step?

[Answer] We shall start in the southern suburbs and the Bekaa at the same time, and after 20 days we hope to move to East Beirut and North Lebanon.

[Question] Are there contacts or coordination with associations or committees in the eastern sector to study the means of distribution?

[Answer] We are holding the necessary contacts for this purpose and are being welcomed.

[Question] Will these aid be periodic, or just for one time?

[Answer] This is not the first time that Saudi Arabia donated aid to Lebanon, and I'm sure it will not be the last time. The Saudis definitely feel the great gratitude of the Lebanese to their assistance and consequently they will respond to the needs of the Lebanese in these difficult times.

[Question] Moving to the political aspect, many reports discussed a project by Sheikh Rafik Hariri for a solution to the Lebanese crisis, while certain political sides denied such a project. How far is this true?

[Answer] I do not know that Rafik Hariri submitted projects, except for the reconstruction of Lebanon.

[Question] How do you describe the phase that separates us from the presidential election?

[Answer] According to me it is definitely difficult.

[Question] From which aspect?

[Answer] The economic crisis which we are witnessing and the daily-living conditions are very bad. Many of the Lebanese live on the remainder of their savings in the bank. There is the money transferred by Lebanese working abroad, but how much they are sufficient, we do not know.

Production has dropped exceedingly in all sectors. I do not know for how long will the economy in Lebanon can stand firm. [sentence as received] Some say that production will increase along with the drop in the value of the pound, but I don't think this could be taken as a rule. The economic development starts with a political solution, and not in any other way.

[Question] Do you see in the horizon any political solution?

[Answer] The vision is bad.

[Question] Do you expect further economic collapse?

[Answer] I know that there is a crisis which the people are facing, and I live with the needy people, in spite of my job in the Hariri Foundation, I share the poor people their sufferings. We are transformed into a begging people, but there are some who refuse to beg. The security situation left nothing for the Lebanese except begging. Those who object to begging, should first object to the civil war which is the major problem of the people.

Many people live on the garbage piles, can we leave them as such, we will be blamed for not helping them.

As for the reaction of the people, I have worked on a number of important and great projects. I used to believe that nothing would be as important as the reconstruction of Beirut, following the Israeli invasion and the establishment of Hariri Foundation. But the reaction of the people proved to me something really important, the people were extremely pleased with these aid, to an extent that proved how much the people were in dire need for the daily-living requests. You cannot imagine how the people's reaction was toward us.

[Question] Do the committees in charge of distribution brief you on the details of their activities?

[Answer] We have an operation room which submits daily reports about the shares distributed every day, and we hold a general meeting each day.

[Question] What is you plan in this respect?

[Answer] We formed teams for each quarter, in fact there are 35 teams for the distribution of shares. On the first day we distribute the coupons to the houses, and on the second day we distribute the shares according to the coupons.

[Question] Is there coordination between the distribution of coupons and the shares schedule?

[Answer] There are supervising schedules but the basic issue is the coupon.

[Question] In case one of the members who distributes coupons gave more than one coupon to a house, how can you control this violation?

[Answer] We can control this. Similar incidents took place in certain quarters, and we found out that the number of houses and the number of coupons were not harmonious, distribution was halted and after the meeting of the inhabitants of that quarter, we found out that there was one person carrying two coupons. So far we have distributed 70,000 shares. There is effective harmony between the shares and the coupons, by 100 percent.

[Question] Therefore, there is control between the coupons and the schedule, and between the coupons and the number of shares. Is the control undertaken by you or by the committee?

[Answer] In principle, each coupon is given by a number of persons, so is the case with respect to the distribution of shares. The people are not ready to free play, because they are very much concerned for the success of the project. The method adopted in conforming the shares to the coupons is submitted to self-control

[Question] Would you like to add anything?

[Answer] I would like to extend my thanks to the Saudi Monarch King Fahd for his donation to the Lebanese people. Such a donation has a wonderful echo among the people of Lebanon.

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**Fadlallah Discusses Role of Islam, Hostages,  
Iran-Iraq War Fadlallah; MONDAY MORNING,  
25-31 Jan 88]**

44000047a Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English  
25-31 Jan 88 pp 10-11

[Article by Amal Fadlallah]

[Text] The Lebanese political status quo should "have a shock" to confront the petrification of the Lebanese formula, which insists that the president of the republic should be a Maronite," the prominent Lebanese Moslem religious leader Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah told MONDAY MORNING last week as Lebanon's presidential race was beginning in earnest. "Let us face this shock.... Let the people be accustomed to living in the wide space of liberty and openness to the future," he

said, rejecting what he called "political Maronitism," which he described as "a project to implement the ambitions of those (who seek to impose) a Maronite ascendancy" on Lebanon.

Had he a Moslem candidate in mind for the presidency?

"I have said that I support a Moslem who believes in my ideas, not one who doesn't," he replied. However he added, he had no particular person in mind since "I know that the sole elector (in the August presidential vote) will be the United States."

Sayyed Fadlallah—who is said to be close to the Hezballah (Party of God) grouping—spoke of his views on the role of Islam as a political concept in the context of the Lebanese polity, which is characterized by diversity of opinions and openness of expression.

He pointed out that the Lebanese system had room for a communist party which "calls for the formation of a Marxist state," and a Baathist party "that advocates formation of a Baathist socialist state... why then is the proposal of an Islamic state so frightening when that of a Marxist state is not so?"

There was no question of imposing Islam by force, he said, "but we do propose it as a concept and a political way that will stir opposition of support and will initiate dialogue. If people accept this way, it will solve their problem. If not, it will remain on the scene of struggle as other concepts are."

Sayyed Fadlallah held out no hope of any quick solution to the Lebanese crisis, optimistic forecasts to the contrary by others notwithstanding. The problem, he suggested, was "that Lebanon is doomed to be an unstable country always vacillating between partition and unity, but not being partitioned, a country whose collapse is prevented by others who, however, do not want it to be stable.

"Therefore," he said, "there might be tactical moves to convince the people that something has taken place after the election of the new president, but the problems will still remain even if some easing of tension is felt." Instrumental in the persistence of these problems, he said, was the fact of Lebanon's regional position and the activity in it of "various intelligence and political spheres."

Had he any ideas on why the seizure of foreign hostages had ceased, we asked.

In view of the "roots of the issue" and its relationship to "political stands," he said, "I do not think there is a new position that will tempt the (further) use of such a method."

Turning to the wider regional scene, Sayyed Fadlallah deplored the "crushed and sacred mentality" with which the two superpowers and their activity are viewed by Middle Eastern people, who however had a patent means of influencing the actions of Moscow and Washington, if they but know it. The peoples of the region, he said, "maintain their potentialities in transforming their points of weakness into points of power. Power is not only in the hands of the powerful."

In this context he welcomed the revolt by Palestinians that began in the Israeli-occupied territories last month. "Let the uprising prove its authenticity, posing a danger to all around it and threatening all compromises," he said, and added: "The uprising proves that all means of oppression have failed and that there is a new confidence witnessed and enjoyed by the Moslems in facing Zionism and imperialism." He only regretted that the rising was "being contained by the Arabs in order to prevent it from overflowing and from posing danger to the Israeli presence within the occupied territories."

Here is the translation of the interview, which was conducted in Arabic.

[Question] During your discussion with (Lebanese journalist) Michel Abou Jawdeh, you approved the candidacy of MP Raymond Edde for the presidency. Do you still support him? He asked you to meet him outside Lebanon. Do you intend to meet him?

[Answer] Mr Abou Jawdeh considered my objective evaluation of the personality of Raymond Edde within the political framework in Lebanon, as a commitment to his candidacy, although I have confirmed during my discussion that any candidate will be an "American" candidate, if not an employee of U.S. intelligence. It is quite natural that we reject any American-backed president, and this is why I made an objective evaluation of what is going on, on the Lebanese scene.

It was not a declaration of a stand. I have issued a statement clarifying the impressions of Mr Abou Jawdeh, in view of my commitment to Islam as a political line within which I move. I cannot commit myself to any president who does not share my views.

As for the meeting with Mr Edde, I welcome any meeting with any political, religious or cultural personality, because I do not believe in closing the door on anyone.

[Question] You propose Islam as a political concept, while others interpret it as an introduction to the establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Lebanon is known for the plurality of its sects. What is your comment?

In Lebanon, people are clever in launching scary ideas, even though they view Lebanon as a country of intellect and civilization. When I propose Islam, I am convinced that Islam is a concept a revealed law and a way of life, which takes into consideration the Moslems and the non-Moslems.

It proposes solutions that find expression in the economic, political security and penal aspects of Islamic law. I consider my proposal for Islam as a solution to the sectarian problem in Lebanon. When Islam is recognized as a political concept, a revealed law and a way of life, whereby those faithful will start a dialogue with others, and when the Christians live Christianity in its true essence as a concept and a religion with ethical values, and when both Christians and Moslem view each other from a reasonable stand point, then they will have many points on which they can meet.

On the other hand, the missionary message of the Christians is to transform all the world into a Christian world, by civilized or uncivilized methods. Why are (Christian) missionary efforts in Africa and Indonesia not considered frightening to the Moslems there? Islam is proposed as a political ideal in a civilized manner that attracts the faithful and calls on the non-believers to accept it. It does not seek to intimidate. The Lebanese look for a method that will govern them while maintaining plurality. But I feel that this plurality is unrealistic, because many of the Moslems and many of the Christians are heretics.

I would like to say that the Christian political establishment agreed to allow the Marxists to have a party which calls for the formation of a Marxist state, and the Baathists to have a party that advocates the formation of an Arab Socialist state, and which in the future will join the idea of Arab unity. It also allowed the Syrian Nationalist Social Party to exist as a political ideology although they call for considering Lebanon part of the Syrian national state. Why then is the proposal of an Islamic state frightening when that of a Marxist state is not so? Is Marxism part of Christianity? Does Marxism protect Christianity as Islam protects Christianity? We shall not impose Islam by force, but we do propose it as a concept and a political way that will stir opposition or support and will initiate dialogue. If people accept this method, it will solve their problem. If not, it will remain on the scene of struggle as other concepts are.

We would like to tell the Christians and the Moslems that, if we want Lebanon to enjoy freedom, the Moslems should say what they want, and the Christians should say what they want. The future will be for the most effective concept, the most effective means, in regard to political power and all objective circumstances that give power.

[Question] Will you tell us more about the meaning of Islam as a political thought?

We set this issue for Dialogue. Perhaps we are mistaken in our understanding of this matter. Christianity in its intellectual and religious context does not propose a political line, but believes in separation between religion and politics, in view of the dictum "Render unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to God what belongs [to] God." It wants to arrange its relations with Caesar in a way to protect its faith and the faith of the people. Christianity does not have a revealed law in its every day context, but (confines its attention to the personal life of the individual). Thus, when Christianity moves in any direction, it will not consider itself an alternative to the political establishment in matters of government. It gives the political atmosphere a religious value and some understanding which speaks of tolerance and love in order to keep politics far from violence. It may move strongly in an indirect or direct manner, according to circumstances, when its presence or freedom of preaching are exposed to danger. It may resort to violence more than others do, and this is known in the history of Christianity, during the struggle among the Christians, or between Christians and heretics, or between Christians and Moslems.

Christianity may propose love, but it may find violence a means for its protection. Islam is a religion that purposes the issue of justice, and sets laws for it in matters of ruling, and the relation between the ruler and the ruled. It proposes the characteristics of the ruler and his relation with his people. It lays down all social, economic and security guidelines that protect the people, and describe justice in detail making it a lively fact linking the goal to the means. Islam proposes liberty of the human being before the world, and the liberty of the people to revolt against their ruler when he deviates, and the liberty of the ruler to impose order on the people. Thus Islam sets laws for the individual in all aspects of his life. It doesn't specify the Moslem, but stresses all human beings. Islam recognizes "the people of the Book," i.e. Christians and Jews, and sets a basis for dialogue with them, and as is mentioned in the Koran, and also sets basis for coexistence with them within specific conditions.

Many feel troubled about the expression "People who are free non-Moslem subjects living in Moslem countries, who in return for paying the capitation tax, enjoyed protection and safety." This also means that they are under the protection of God, his prophet and of all the Moslems. This allows for more openness and paves the way for a scientific and objective dialogue. For 14 centuries, we notice that Christians and Jews existed in Islamic countries, and whenever there were problems against the Christians and the Jews, there were also problems against the Moslems themselves. This takes place anywhere and against anyone. The issue would not have culminated in hatred and fear, had we been able to start a calm dialogue with a view to solving the problem. We believe in all the values preached by the Prophets Issa and Moussa, which are also mentioned and immortalized in the Koran and therefore we cannot but be open to all religions.

[Question] What we understand from a statement by you is that you support the candidacy of a Moslem for the presidency. Is this the case?

[Answer] I have said that I support a Moslem who believes in my ideas, not a Moslem who does not. The existing political status quo should have a "shock" to confront this petrification of the formula which insists that the president of the republic should be a Maronite. Let us face this shock even in a way that may not fulfill at the prerequisites. Let the people be accustomed to live in the wide space of liberty and openness to the future. We think Islamically in an intellectual manner, and not in a sectarian manner. We do not view political Maronitism, (the idea of a) Maronite state, in the religious sense of the word, but rather as a political project to implement the ambitions of (those who seek to impose) a Maronite ascendancy.

[Question] This means that you do not have a Moslem candidate?

[Answer] At this point I do not have a Moslem candidate, because I know that the sole elector will be the United States.

What do you say about your nomination as a presidential candidate on behalf of the Islamic Community?

I have heard about this and did not respect it, and I will not discuss this matter in this way. I refuse to raise this issue in the manner presented by this group, because I practice self respect in the method of handling this issue, which is my nature.

[Question] Many people foresee positive developments on the horizon which will be followed by the beginning of a solution to the Lebanese crisis, with the opening of the presidential election campaign. Other people see the contrary. What is your view of the future?

[Answer] I do not know what these people conceive as positive developments in the situation. Have we reached any result that may separate the Lebanese crisis from the Middle East crisis? Is there an international agreement that will make Lebanon lose its role as a focus for all the problems of the area? Has Lebanon stopped being the place where one can "eavesdrop" on all the region's trends? When all these matters are resolved and all issues closed, and the issue remains only an inter-Lebanese one, then the Moslem-Christian conflict will be easily resolved. The problem is not a problem between Christian and Moslems on the person of the president of the republic, or in the manner of government. The problem is that Lebanon is doomed to be an unstable country that will always vacillate between partition and unity, but will not be partitioned, a country whose collapse is prevented by others who however do not want it to be stable. Therefore there might be tactical moves to convince the

people that something has taken place after the election of the new president, but the problems will still remain even if some easing in tension is felt.

[Question] Your statement means that the forthcoming president will be only a "manager" of the crisis?

[Answer] I can propose another alternative, namely that the new president will be a president responsible nearly for carrying current business. Everything depends on the circumstances.

[Question] Does this mean that you do not see a solution to the Lebanese crisis in the short term or even the long run?

[Answer] The Lebanese crisis we are facing might find a solution in the nineties, but the Lebanese crisis which is linked to the regional role of Lebanon will remain as long as Lebanon is involved in various intelligence and political spheres.

[Question] Why in the nineties?

[Answer] Because solving the Middle East crisis awaits the results of the election of new presidents in some European countries. It is quite natural that the issue will start in the second year that follows election of a new U.S. president. If there is a scope for an international conference, there might be a solution. In such an event the president of 1994 will be the president who will solve the Lebanese crisis.

[Question] Where has the hostage issue reached? When do you think they will be released? Do you think the way in which the French hostages were freed was the right way?

[Answer] You must ask those who "activate" this matter, since they are not found in Lebanon. I mean that this issue moves in an international sphere where positions are numerous, and I do not mean a specific position.

[Question] In your opinion, why has the kidnapping stopped? Is it because there are no more foreigners in Lebanon, or because the policy has changed in this respect?

[Answer] When we understand the roots of the issue, we will know that it fulfilled its mission in the political stands from which it started. Thus I do not think there is a new position that will tempt the use of such a method.

[Question] Crown Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia has said that the Iraqi-Iranian war will end "in 1988." Amidst the current, calm Syrian mediation between Iran and the Gulf states, do you think his statement is valid?

[Answer] I imagine that the Gulf War is greater than an international issue, and cannot be erased through a mediation, with our deep respect to the Syrian role. The

Gulf War, I believe, in nature centers on the Islamic Revolution, the aim of which is not to penetrate the Gulf states, but rather to be transformed through Islam into an alternative to one of the two other "equations" which now dominate the world—I mean Marxism and capitalism. Thus I believe that the Gulf War may be more dangerous to imperialism than the Palestinian issue. I can imagine a sort of an armistice, but not a solution unless, there are great surprises which may destroy many equations. Iran no longer aspires to be the policeman of the Gulf, as it tried to be under the shah and under U.S. Influence. The war can destroy some of the equations, or alternatively, it may cause a rapprochement between them.

[Question] Don't you think that the two superpowers are now in a position to put an end to the Gulf War?

[Answer] I do not think the issue is that critical. They might agree on calming down the war to avoid an explosion which may harm the interests of both. But we must know that the superpowers are not everything. The peoples can be in a position to activate movement by the superpowers and can sabotage some of the courses before them.

We have a crushed and sacred mentality regarding the superpowers. We understand that there are certain "equations" in which the superpowers cannot penetrate. This is why the peoples maintain their potentialities in transforming their points of weakness into points of power. Power is not always only in the hands of the powerful.

[Question] How do you evaluate the uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories? What are its dimensions and how do you imagine its coming results?

[Answer] The uprising is a movement by a new generation that is totally independent of any organizational and political backgrounds. It is the result of the sufferings of oppression witnessed by the new generation, who find themselves strangled in their present and their future, and have been able to find in Islam an incentive.

The Palestinian child, youth and woman who stand in front of a tank do not think of the power of the tank, but of the stone that will wound the head of the Israeli soldier and of the knife that will stab the chest and back of the enemy.

Their uprising is an equation that stores a revolution, in spite of the difficult circumstances. I believe that the Arabs were taken by surprise as were international circles. This is why the Arab scene is not able to embrace it. Let the uprising prove its authenticity, posing a danger to all those around it, and threatening all compromises. I feel that the uprising is being contained by the Arabs in order to prevent it from overflowing and from posing a danger to the Israeli presence within the occupied territories. The uprising proves that all means

of oppression have failed, and that there is a new confidence witnessed and enjoyed by the Moslems in facing Zionism and imperialism.

[Question] How do you see the future of Iran to be in view of your previous answers, namely that there are small states that later became superpowers and vice versa?

[Answer] In Iran there is a real revolution. I visited Iran 2 months ago, and found that the people, who sacrificed many victims to war and witnessed the ugliest destruction, are still strong and sincere to the revolution, and are not yet tired. They are determined to continue their struggle in the future.

There are leaders in Iran who respect the people and are frank with the people. Iman Khomeini criticizes the officials if they make mistakes. The government is not unanimously approved by the Consultative Council; each minister must gain confidence. There is real supervision, there are problems, there are points of weakness, there are those who oppose, but the opposition will not shake the atmosphere. Iran is acting on the basis of its Islamic personality and has found in the Islamic world a response, in spite of media propaganda against its role and its form. It possesses power that is growing.

As for its strategic position, this allows it to be free in playing a role in the struggle between the two superpowers. It does not move in the policy of balance. It has a political strategy linked to the individual issue of the strategy of this country or that.

Iran has its borders with the Soviet Union, and forms a problem through the Soviet Moslems. Thus the United States and the Soviet Union cannot venture to fragment Iran. The Iranian people are a people with patience, determination and self-restraint.

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## SUDAN

### **AL-ITTIHAD Reports Bank System Debts Reach Three Billion Pounds**

JN031147 Khartoum SUNA in English  
0938 GMT 3 Mar 88

[Text] Khartoum, Mar 3 (SUNA)—The size of debts from the banking system since the current government took over power reached about three billion Sudanese pounds, AL-ITTIHAD newspaper today reported.

An economic source told the newspaper that the inflation last year increased at 40 percent and it is expected to increase during this year.

The source predicted the devaluation of the Sudanese pound unless the government reduces the size of debts from the banking system.

### **Satire Criticizes President, Government Officials** 45000024 Khartoum SUDAN TIMES in English 2, 9 Feb 88

[Article by Dr Ali Beshir Abdalla, Faculty of Vet. Science, Khartoum North: "Sadistan: The Strange Ways of President Sadi"]

#### **[Part I, 2 Feb 88, p 2]**

[Text] One year has now passed since I made my, historical shall we say, revisit to Sadistan. I hope the reader still remembers the purpose behind my coming back to this most interesting country. I came back to prepare material for my book on life in Sadistan, and on Sadistan's enigmatic leader, President Sadi. Since I came back I have been holding talks and discussions with my old friend Hassan, and also with other people: academicians, educated and uneducated, females and males. These talks and discussions have produced a wealth of invaluable information for my book.

During my stay in Cartoon I met many people who were simply astonished to see me interested in a country like Sadistan.

"What is it that interests you in this country?", they would ask with all sincerity. Some of them would even say that my interests in a country like Sadistan was not a normal interest but a perversion. I did not tell them that throughout my life I had been gripped with an interest in those things, places, and people that would make one wonder. Wonder? Well, the reader will discover the answer as he goes on perusing this story about Sadistan and President Sadi.

For those who think that it is an easy job to write a book on Sadistan, I would like to point out that I have never embarked on a task more difficult or more dangerous. Any such writing would be, of necessity, critical, in one way or another, of President Sadi, and here lies the real danger. No publishing house would dare publish such a book, or any parts of it. But in Sadistan, as in other places, you will find some people who are courageous enough to tell the truth. These who publish SADISTAN CHIMES have agreed to publish my book.

There is no better start to our story about Sadistan than Cartoon itself. This is the town which President Sadi and his Mouth, Cur Al Nayem, call "The Town of Towns." Cur Al Nayem, also known popularly as the Blunderer, would even venture and call it the gem of Aprica. Cartoon in reality is the epitome of ridiculousness. It is a town which wallows in dirt in the morning, and bathes in filth in the evening. It is a place where everything seems absurd and unreal, and everything out of place. The behaviour of the people of Cartoon shows that absurdity at its highest.

It is only in Cartoon that shop-keepers fix their own prices for commodities. It is certainly only in Cartoon that you buy engine oil not at petrol stations but at newspaper kiosks after paying double the price. Sugar, cooking oil, washing soap, in quantities sufficient for a whole province, are smuggled every day from Cartoon and are sold at exorbitant prices in the rural areas. One merely wonders how a thing like this could happen in day light and night under the nose of the government.

Actually, there is no reason for wondering as one intellectual (not Hassan, but another of a quite different breed) has explained to me. His explanation is that Cartoon, like the whole of Sadistan, is governed in accordance with the principle of Mutual Benefits. The authorities know and understand what the smugglers are doing. The smugglers on their part know and understand what the authorities are not doing. But both the authorities and the smugglers are happy. The smugglers are happy because they can smuggle. The authorities are happy because they know who are the final recipients of the huge profits the smugglers make in the black market. Where on earth can you find laws as funny as those in Cartoon? A Sadistene who steals twenty pounds will have one of his limbs chopped off. Stealing twenty million pounds is an achievement that qualifies one for the medal of "The Good Son of Sadistan." The laws are not applied equally on all people. My friend Hassan once explained to me the "logic" behind this inequality. He said that if the laws were applied equally on all, then all the Presidents, Ministers, and senior government officials would definitely become limbless. In that case, he said, the Presidents and Ministers would be unable to sign the decrees for the arrest of political opponents, for the raising of the prices of bread and petrol, or for the state of emergency. The Presidents would also be unable to sign, and therefore approve, sentences such as extraction of the teeth, stoning to death, or flogging. Hassan further argued that there would be no limbed senior official to carry these decrees to the police for implementation.

These laws of Sadistan were devised by the President who ruled before President Sadi. That President convinced some of his people that the pickpockets were the real threat to the stability and peace of the country. He then landed on the poor, chopping their limbs and smashing their teeth.

After the former President ran away the incredulous people discovered that he had robbed them of five billion pounds.

During my stay in Cartoon nothing perplexed me more than the insistence of the Presidents on the application of these savage laws. Fortunately, one University professor explained it all to me. In his own words "Chopping off of the hands is a barbaric act which indicates the hatred felt towards a thief by those who devise these laws. But that feeling of hatred is natural. A person hates

only those who are competing with him. A big businessman does not like small businessmen. A professional thief does not look with favour on those amateurish ones. When a professional thief becomes a Minister or President, he will enact laws tailored especially to curb the activities of the small thieves. He himself, is immune to the law.

This then is Cartoon, the heap on top of which sits the pompous President Sadi of Sadistan.

How did President Sadi become the President? To answer that question we have to go back to the era of his predecessor, the Field Marshal, the real Field Marshal. That Field Marshal was a tyrant. His tyranny was directed against the innocent people. He was the one who devised the funny laws of Sadistan. It happened that there was, in Cartoon, a man whose name was Terry Beaver. He was not a Sadistene; he came from a place called the United Countries. Terry Beaver was also known as the Whisperer. It was his job to whisper. Knowledgeable sources told me that Whisper was a very intelligent man. If he was asked to "arrange" anything, he would do so with a perfection rarely seen. The Field Marshal used to consult him. The dictator was a brute towards his people, but in the presence of Terry Beaver he was as docile as a lamb. One day the Whisperer came to the Field Marshal and whispered the following into the right ear of the tyrant "Arrest the religious fanatics. They are useful to us." He was referring to those fanatics led by Dr Hurabi (not Hammurabi, as often appears in the foreign press). The tyrant was a simpleton. He could not understand why he was asked to arrest the fanatics, he could not grasp what "us" meant. So he did exactly what Terry Beaver told him to do. After some time the Whisperer came again to the Field Marshal and into his left ear whispered the following, "Pack all your clothes, take all the money you have been able to steal up to now, and leave immediately. We will find a safe haven for you and your wife." The tyrant was shocked. He was almost in tears. He was transformed suddenly into a child begging for mercy. But the message was clear, Terry Beaver was not the argumentative type, and the tyrant was not in a position to disobey. After the departure of the dictator, Terry Beaver started his real work for which, I am sure, he was given the medal of "The Good Son of the United Countries."

There was to be more important whispering. The Whisperer went to the cronies of the former tyrant, the Generals, and into their big ears whispered the following "Occupy the seat of the former President." The Generals, being of the same mentality as their mentor, were thrown into confusion. They rushed to each other, thought the matter over, dispersed, and met again for more deliberations. Actually, there was no need for deliberations. The Generals could not deliberate even if they wanted to. The Whisperer went this time to Komer Al Nayeb, Head of the former tyrant's Safety Apparatus. Then and there the "nice and perfect arrangement" was ready. One morning the people woke up to find many

Generals seated on the same seat that had previously been occupied by the Field Marshal. The people were amazed. They could not understand how that happened. Of course they did not know of the existence, at that time, of the scheming Beaver, the Whisperer. The perfectionist then made his final whisper as a result of which the people of Sadistan are suffering now. He whispered into the big ears of the Generals "Arrange it in such a way that the next President shall be either Dr. Hurabi or Mr. Sadi. Make no serious changes. Keep business as usual." The cronies of the former tyrant were as obedient as their Field Marshal had been. They did what Terry Beaver, the Whisperer had asked them to do. That is how Mr. Sadi became President Sadi of Sadistan.

[Part II, 9 Feb 88 p 3]

At this stage we know Mr. Sadi of Sadistan. What type of man is President Sadi? Has he been able so far to achieve anything for his people? The first question is not easy to answer. The second is clear and straightforward.

President Sadi appears as an enigma to many people. To his supporters he is a superhuman. Many of his supporters, the Blunderer among them, seriously believe that Mother Nature has given birth to only two gentlemen: Adam and President Sadi. To me President Sadi is an ordinary mortal whose greed for fame and power knows no limits. In these parts of the world you will find many like him. They are all politicians who are usually without special merits. They are, however, masters when it comes to playing up tribalism, religion, or ethnicity. Despite his trickiness, President Sadi is still hollow and inept. Indeed, among the hollow and inept President Sadi has no peer. He spends most of his time delivering speeches which are always without substance. For the persistent observer, President Sadi's wisdom, programmes, and objectives all seem to reside in his vocal cords. There is no gathering that he will not address, no conference that he will not deliver a speech to. It is rumoured that once his motorcade passed by a funeral. He immediately asked his aides to stop so that he could deliver a fiery speech. Cur Al Nayem, the Blunderer, pointed out to President Sadi that that would be unbecoming. The President finally agreed with the Blunderer. As far as people in Sadistan can recall, that was the only time the Blunderer said or did something right.

The character of President Sadi is better exposed in his dealings with the other political parties. In all his dealings he makes it quite clear that whatever discussions other politicians hold, or whatever agreement they reach, he, and he alone, remains the final authority. He has convinced himself that he is the only legitimate ruler of Sadistan, and, to convince the people of that, he resorts to all means available to him. The means available to him are many. They include cheating, lying, and luring politicians with promises of positions and wealth. If all those fail, then he will play one politician against the other. No one can deny that in this respect he has had

some success. He knows that there are scores of politicians who will drool whenever money and positions are mentioned. But the success of President Sadi in that field has become, in a way, his failure. Ordinary people no longer trust him. No more do they believe his daily utterances. They are convinced beyond doubt that he has completely lost credibility.

In his daily harangues, President Sadi never misses the chance to talk at length about his achievements. Upon hearing such speeches a labourer will no doubt search his pocket; perhaps the achievements are lurking there without his knowing it. Of course, his pocket will be empty. In reply to my question about President Sadi's achievements! an angry Sadistene said "If he claims to have made so many achievements, why is he locking them up in a safe? Why doesn't he want the people to see them? Perhaps, he is ashamed of them."

A foreigner like me always finds himself baffled by President Sadi's repeated claims that he has many achievements. Even a casual observer will instantly discover the glaring truth that life for the ordinary man is becoming more difficult every day, his standard of living is falling every hour. The ordinary man cannot find medicines in the hospital or in the private pharmacies. He is unable to find bread. He cannot afford to buy meat. Take, as an example, a labourer with four children of school age, whose monthly salary is about three hundred pounds. He has to give his children six pounds every morning for the bus fare and for breakfast at the school. From what remains of his salary, he has to pay the rent, provide his family with food, pay for medicines (if he can find them), buy clothes and notebooks for his children.

President Sadi evidently does not understand the misery such a family lives in.

Real achievements for any government lie in a strong, growing economy, in lowering inflation, in reducing unemployment and in bringing peace to the country. Sadistan is at present in a deep crisis. Its economy has collapsed. Inflation is running at unheard of rates. You get the impression that almost everyone is unemployed. The country is ravaged by a civil war. These are the problems of Sadistan. These are the real problems which President Sadi intends to solve by eloquence and political scheming.

President Sadi's views about the civil war may be bewildering to those who do not know his real nature. To those who know him well, these views are the normal views of a man of his make-up and mentality. The ex-colonel who is leading the rebellion against the shaky and corrupt government of Sadistan has not put forward a single unreasonable demand. What he and his men are fighting for is a cause which any human with dignity will fight for. They want all the Sadistenes to be equal. But they have one objective which makes President Sadi unable to sleep. Their objective is to change Sadistan, to give it a new name, a new identity, all based on the

realities of Sadistan. This is what infuriates President Sadi. Without Sadistan being Sadistan he has no future, and for him power will be as elusive as his so-called achievements. President Sadi is in a real dilemma. He knows that the whole world regards the demands made by the ex-colonel and his men as the most reasonable. But accepting those very reasonable demands means that he, or his sons, will not find the road to the seat of power so well paved as it is now.

Finding himself in such a difficulty, President Sadi has been behaving irrationally. He has foolishly embarked on a campaign of hatred against the Kinkas, the tribe to which the ex-colonel belongs. The Kinkas are tall, beautiful, and proud people. If you ever saw a Kinka girl, you would most probably think she was the work of Phidias, not the God that created Cur Al Nayem.

It is unfortunate that President Sadi is not wise enough to see that the Kinkas are not, and will not be, the only people who ask for justice, or fight for it. There are oppressed people in the east, north, and west. Even his own supporters will soon discover that, like the Kinkas, they are also victims of the exploitative system of President Sadi. Were President Sadi a good reader, he would definitely stop hating the Kinkas. But rallies do not allow him a spare time to read even his own genealogical tree!

The other irrationality of President Sadi concerns the role of religion in the state. It is in matters related to religion that President Sadi becomes really uncompromising. This rigid attitude stems from his realization that without a religious system he will stand naked, stripped of all ornaments. He is also a good calculator. He knows quite well that he is not an achiever, that it is not in his interest to achieve anything for the people, and that only in a religious system are the people unable to challenge an inept ruler. He is not telling the truth when he says that, by introducing religion, he is bowing to the wishes of the people. In that respect, one educated Sadistene had this to say "President Sadi's supporters are mostly nomadic who live in the poor areas. They do not know much about religious laws or religious systems. Their daily concerns are grass and water for their animals, and dura and sugar for themselves. These are their needs."

It is clear that President Sadi's drive to establish a religious state is dictated by his own desire to perpetuate his own rule and the rule of his family.

Will President Sadi succeed in his drive to establish a religious state? Here, one must take some facts into consideration. First, there is that war waged by the ex-colonel and his men. These people are determined not to sleep in the same bed with a system that is based on religion, ethnicity or family. With the prospect of a theocracy looming on the horizon, they will not lay down their arms or abandon the struggle. Second, the government of Sadistan will continue spending billions of pounds on armaments. Life will become unbearable for

everybody. There will be grumbling, demonstrations, strikes, and, finally, an Uprising to correct the path of the Uprising. The future does not bode well for Sadistan under President Sadi. He simply does not care about the war, about the money spent on it, or about those who get killed in it. He does not care so long as it is someone else who dies, and someone else who pays the cost of the war.

/06662

## TUNISIA

### Arab Diplomats Say Bourguiba Free To Leave Country

45000028 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
20 Feb 88 p 6

[Text] Arab diplomatic sources acquainted with developments in the Tunisian situation have said that there is nothing that prevents former President Habib Bourguiba from leaving his country, be it for medical treatment or for permanent residence. The sources explained that Bourguiba himself wishes to remain in Tunis and that Tunisian officials have taken care to provide all of the amenities for him at his place of residence in the suburbs of the capital. They themselves did not ask the former president to leave his country and they are not considering it. The sources indicated that Bourguiba receives a number of visitors and relatives and that his views on the new regime have changed in the past few weeks, having become 'more positive' than in the past.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### Soviet Delegation Discusses Water, Electricity Projects

44040115a Dubayy AL-ITTihad in Arabic  
9 Feb 88 p 4

[Article: "Soviet Delegation Discusses Areas of Joint Cooperation With Officials Of the al-'Ayn Water and Electricity Department"]

[Text] During a meeting with Deputy Director of the al-'Ayn Water and Electricity Department His Excellency 'Abdallah Hasan, the Soviet delegation currently visiting the country was briefed on the department's work programs and plans. Soviet Ambassador Felix Nikolayevich was also present at the meeting. The delegation listened to a brief summary by the deputy director of how much electricity and water the city of al-'Ayn consumes and what is being done at present to increase energy production to meet the population increase.

The head of the Soviet delegation expressed his country's continuing readiness to cooperate with the department in the field of electricity and water technology, while the deputy director of the Water and Electricity Department welcomed such cooperation, which would be mutually beneficial to both sides.

In another context, the Soviet delegation held a lengthy meeting with a group of engineers from the department's water section and from the Agriculture and Animal Production Department.

The day before yesterday the Soviet delegation met with officials of the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Department for a wide-ranging discussion session, during which both sides discussed the possibilities of joint technical cooperation, particularly in prospecting for ground water resources via satellite and using modern technology to develop them.

8559

**Sharjah Port's 1987 Import Statistics**  
*44040115c Dubayy AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic*  
6 Feb 88 p 17

[Article: "From January to November 1987, UAE Imported 1.84 Billion UAE Dirhams Worth of Goods Through Sharjah; Japan Was the Principal Importer, Followed by the United States and France"]

[Text] During the first 11 months of 1987, the UAE imported a total of 476,429,361 kilograms of goods, worth 1,829,985,746 UAE dirhams, through the port of Sharjah. These figures were released by the statistics section of the Sharjah Customs Department.

The figures showed that during the period from 1 January to 30 November 1987, 571,119,001 dirhams worth of foodstuffs and livestock, 394,597,339 dirhams worth of transportation machines and equipment, and 322,070,291 dirhams worth of miscellaneous manufactured goods were imported.

Furthermore, 268,067,063 dirhams worth of assorted manufactured goods for industrial purposes, 118,245,209 dirhams worth of chemical goods and other related products, and 66,627,069 dirhams worth of beverages and tobacco products were imported during that period.

The statistics showed that during the first 11 months of last year, 48,364,862 dirhams worth of mineral fuels and related substances and 24,120,237 dirhams worth of animal and vegetable oils and fats were imported.

The figures indicated that Japan was at the head of the list of countries exporting goods to the UAE through Sharjah during that period, since Japanese imports amounted to about 367.2 million dirhams. Next came the United States, with 135.9 million dirhams, and then France, whose imports via Sharjah amounted to 126.7 million dirhams.

India held fourth place among countries exporting goods to the UAE via Sharjah, with 110.6 million dirhams worth of imports. The United Kingdom held fifth place, with 91.8 million dirhams worth of imports. Then came

West Germany, with 80.3 million dirhams; Sri Lanka, with 69.1 million dirhams; Italy, with 53 million dirhams; and Singapore, with 50.5 million dirhams. Taiwan held tenth place, with 48.9 million dirhams. The UAE imports goods from about 72 countries through the port of Sharjah.

8559

**Civil Defense Office Sponsors Shelter Technology Seminar**

*44040115b Dubayy AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic*  
4 Feb 88 p 4

[Article by Jamal Abu Talib: "Civil Defense Seminar Reviews the Latest Shelter Technology Equipment For Protecting the Population From Conventional and Nuclear War and From Chemical and Germ Warfare"]

[Text] The Civil Defense Officials' Shelter Technology Seminar was convened yesterday morning. Present were Director of the General Civil Defense Department Col Hamid 'Ali Sayf, the charge d'affairs of the Swiss embassy, and officials from a Swiss company specializing in shelter technology.

Col Hamid 'Ali Sayf delivered a speech in which he praised bilateral relations with Switzerland, particularly in economic areas. He said, "This seminar, the first to be held at the civil defense headquarters, is an initiative which the General Civil Defense Department intends to continue."

He added, "These seminars and classes will provide participants with further information on civil defense technology and modern military sciences, by following up all the new advanced equipment and by training the technical personnel who will use them."

The Swiss charge d'affairs and the representative of the Swiss company both delivered speeches on this occasion, and Director of the Abu Dhabi Civil Defense Department Maj 'Ubayd Abu 'Afrah also addressed the seminar.

During the seminar, films were shown of the technological equipment used in building shelters to protect people from radiation and other dangers.

Officials from the Swiss company also reviewed protective shelter equipment, such as armored doors, ventilation tubes, and manually-operated ventilation equipment, designed to protect people from conventional and nuclear weapons, poison gas, and chemical and germ warfare. All of this equipment is being carefully tested in explosions. Technological shelters have special ventilation systems and their own first aid equipment, as well as special equipment to purify waste water, and can be used in peace time as storehouses for foods and other items.

8559

## IRAN

### Trade, Expansion of Relations With Soviets To Be Discussed

46400089a London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Feb 88 p 4

[Text] The eleventh joint talks on economic cooperation between the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union are to be held late this week in Moscow. Representatives from the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union will discuss the expansion of the Esfahan iron foundry, cooperation in the construction of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical industrial units, the construction of an alumina plant, the expansion of the Esfahan power plant and the Ramin power plant of Ahvaz, the construction of a new electrical power plant on the Caspian coast, cooperation in the Arak machinery plants, the housing factories, projects in agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry, combatting blights on vegetation, and the training of specialist manpower to work in various development projects.

Recently Daisof, an economic advisor at the Soviet embassy in Tehran, gave a press conference in which he discussed projects to dig an Iranian oil well in the Caspian Sea. He said: Recently the Soviet supply ship Charu'id anchored at Bandar Onzoli (Pahlavi) to begin drilling the first Iranian oil well. The economic advisor for the Soviet embassy in Tehran added: According to predictions that have been made, work on affairs related to the first treaty should be completed within six months and the report submitted to the relevant officials.

With regard to cooperation in animal husbandry and agriculture between the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union, Daisof noted that other than the construction of a silo for Iran, no other project has been discussed. Daisof added: Most of the cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in the area of agriculture involves the construction of silos. If we regard Iran's storage capacity as more than a million tons, we built about 800,000 tons of it.

During a press conference on the quantity and quality of economic cooperation between Iran and the Soviet Union, Vladimir Gudev, Moscow's ambassador in Tehran, while stressing the necessity of expanding commercial relations between the two nations, mentioned the geography and history shared by the two neighbor countries, and that the Soviet Union, by making changes in its isolation and economic measures, has opened broader possibilities for cooperation in carrying out economic projects with foreign countries. The Soviet Union's Tehran ambassador stressed the necessity for perpetuating and expanding economic and commercial relations between the two countries. He said: We support expanded relations between the Soviet Union and the Islamic Republic on the strong basis of mutual confidence, and this clearly will also entail stability in the political relations between the two nations.

Elsewhere in his press conference, the Soviet ambassador to the Islamic Republic discussed precedents in commercial relations between the two nations. He said: Unfortunately, in the years before 1987 the volume of commercial exchanges between the two countries fell considerably, to a level that in no way answers to the possibilities and inclinations of the two sides. In 1986 the volume of commercial exchanges between the two nations fell to one percent of the level in previous years. However, in view of the desire on both sides to expand relations, in the last year and a half we have been able to increase to an extent the volume of commercial exchanges and the level of economic cooperation. Continuing his remarks, Vladimir Gudev told news correspondents: In this regard, the volume of trade between the two countries doubled in 1987 compared to 1986, and we were able to sign treaties in certain areas, such as cooperative oil exploration in the southern part of the Caspian Sea and the construction of a joint shipping line in the Sea of Mazandaran. Likewise, flights by the Soviet airline Aeroflot are to begin again, and treaties are to be signed between the two countries for improving the Esfahan iron foundry and the Ahvaz Ramin power plant.

In this regard the Soviet ambassador added that recently an agreement has been signed for the export of Iranian crude oil to the Soviet Union and for the return of part of it to the Islamic Republic in the form of refined products, and the rest of the crude oil will be exchanged for machinery and equipment to be sent to the Islamic Republic. Continuing, Vladimir Gudev expressed his pleasure at the expanded economic cooperation between the two nations. He said: The Islamic Republic has great need for refined petroleum products, and the Soviet Union has many resources in this area, some of which are in areas adjacent to Iran.

Discussing other areas of cooperation between the two nations, he mentioned the construction of electrical installations in Iran. He said: The foundation for such activities is the belief that the Soviet Union has much experience and resources in the area of power production and transmission, and that it can make this experience available to the Islamic Republic.

9310

### IRI-Turkish Cooperation Reported

#### Political Agreement

46400093 London KEYHAN in Persian 25 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] Following the visit by 'Ali Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister of the regime, to Ankara and the visit of Turgut Ozal, the prime minister of Turkey, to Tehran, the two governments of Iran and Turkey reached agreement for future cooperation in various political and economic areas.

Opposition groups, including the Tudeh Party, announced that the cooperation between Iran and Turkey in political areas will include the exchange of security information concerning the activities of those groups opposing the Tehran regime in Turkey as well as the activities of Armenian terrorist groups in Iran.

It is also said that the central guard forces of both countries will cooperate closely to control the smuggling of people and the activities of the Kurds in the Iran-Turkey and Iraq border areas. Turkey has asked the Islamic Republic to help fight the separatists and the Armenian terrorist groups.

The nationalist opposition groups have not yet expressed their views regarding the effects of the cooperation between the regime of Tehran and the government of Turkey in political and security affairs, but it is said that given that the government of Turkey is trying to enter European society officially, any kind of problem created by that country in regards to Iranian political refugees will have negative repercussions for Turkey.

Last week, the Cabinet of the regime also approved the plan to build a pipeline to bring southern oil closer to the world markets. This plan is for the same pipeline that is to bring Iranian oil to the vicinity of the Port of Iskenderun. The Turks are very interested in this plan, but Iranian experts do not support it. The Cabinet of the Islamic Republic also approved another plan to bring Iranian oil to the Sea of Oman, which in practice might eliminate the issue of the oil pipeline to the Port of Iskenderun.

#### **Transportation Company**

46400093 London KEYHAN in Persian 25 Feb 88 p 4

[Text] The Islamic Republic and Turkey are trying to establish a joint transportation company in order to facilitate the transportation of goods to Iran.

This company, the capital for which will be provided equally by both countries, will be established within the next few weeks. Turkish officials, who announced this report last week, added that Turgut Ozal, the prime minister of that country, will leave for Tehran on 28 February to meet with his Iranian counterpart and sign the agreement to establish this joint Iran-Turkey transportation company. Turkish officials also announced that during his stay of several days in Iran, Turgut Ozal, in addition to signing the above-mentioned agreement, will also negotiate concerning the agreement to build the Ahvaz-(Duritul) pipeline on the Mediterranean Sea with the economic and petroleum officials of the Islamic Republic and will probably sign the final agreement concerning the building of the above-mentioned pipeline. A Turkish economic official anticipates that Turgut Ozal and Mir Hoseyn Musavi will discuss the problems concerning trade relations between Tehran and Ankara. This official added that despite much effort on the part of the economic and trade officials of the two countries

to expand commerce and bring the volume of trade to the annual level of \$2 billion, still the value of trade between Tehran and Ankara has not exceeded \$1.3 billion.

10000

#### **Frankfort Becomes Center for Weapons Export to IRI**

46400090a London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Feb 88 p 4

[Text] For many years the Islamic Republic's center for the purchase of arms and munitions was its military procurement office at Number Four Victoria Street in London. The activities of this office—which was closed by English officials in October of last year—were precisely monitored by British security agents through concealed recording devices. English MI-6 security agents were well aware which European country had signed a secret arms and war materiel procurement treaty with the Islamic Republic.

The above is part of a book published recently concerning secret activities in France selling arms to Tehran. The authors of this documented book, titled "Arms for Iran," studied all the secret activities selling munitions and war materiel to the Islamic Republic from 1981 to present. Relying on irrefutable and documented sources, they revealed the type and extent of involvement by European governments in sending weapons and munitions of various types to the Islamic Republic.

Walter de Buque and and Jean Charles Dino, authors of the book "Arms for Iran," disclosed in their tumultuous book that an international arms sales cartel in Europe, with 14-member nations, guides and leads activities exporting arms to various parts of the world, including the Islamic Republic. The 14 member nations of this cartel, known as the European Security Studies Union (ESAP), are France, Belgium, Holland, West Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Finland, England, and two other non-European nations. In part of their book the writers proved that despite the embargo on arms sales to the Islamic Republic by the French government, this government's officials have been aware since 1980 of a semi-official network conducting arms transactions with Tehran and were ignoring its illegal activities.

In their book, Walter de Buque and and Jean Charles Dino noted that the international network selling arms to the nations of the world (ESAP) has so much power that in the last few years it has been able to procure and deliver any quantity of arms needed by Third World nations, including the Islamic Republic, regardless of the legal problems in the European nations. In their book, the two writers conclude that it certainly would not be possible for the members of the international arms sales cartel to export war materiel to the buyer nations without the approval of the European governments, and for this reason each European nation belonging to the cartel

authorized the activities of the agents involved and the merchants of death, in view of the enormous benefits obtained in such transactions.

9310

**Swedish Missiles Found Installed on IRI's Floating Platforms**

46400090b London KEYHAN in Persian 18 Feb 88 p 3

[Text] According to the newspaper DAGENS NYHETER published in Stockholm, Iran has installed Swedish-built RBS-70 missiles on its floating oil platforms in the Persian Gulf. Quoting the Swedish Foreign Ministry, this newspaper adds: We made a detailed study of this matter showing that Iran has mounted RBS-70 missiles on those platforms. The newspapers AL-AH-RAM, published in Cairo, and AL-QABAS published in Kuwait say concerning these missiles: In the years 1980-1981 Sweden sold 143 RBS-70 missiles to Singapore, but later these missiles were sent to Iran illegally.

9310

**Section of Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas Rail To Become Operational**

46400089b London KEYHAN in Persian 18 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] Part of the Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas rail line will be operational by the end of the current year. Sa'idi Kia, the Islamic Republic's minister of roads and transportation, recently met with the Islamic Republic's Council of Ministers and gave a report on the progress building the Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas rail line. Construction of the Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas rail line began about seven years ago. It connects the city of Bafq in the Province of Yazd with Bandar 'Abbas. This line is about 650 kilometers long, and when it is connected to Bandar 'Abbas, part of the activity transporting passengers and especially freight by train from this port to other parts of the country and back will begin. In the text of his report submitted to the Council of Ministers, the Islamic Republic's minister of roads and transportation announced that about 350 kilometers of this rail line will be completed by the end of the current year 1366 [20 March 1988] and can go into operation.

He added: The remainder of this line, about 40 percent of whose construction has begun, will be completed in 1372 [21 March 1993 - 20 March 1994], and it will be operational in about six years from now.

9310

**Khomeyni's Decree Causing Uneasiness Among Ruling Clergy**

46400077a London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Jan 88 p 1

[Text] During the last few days the mass media of the Islamic Republic have decreased their intense propaganda regarding the absolute rule of Ayatollah Khomeyni and the KEYHAN and ETTELA'AT newspapers—which are published under the supervision of

Ayatollah Khomeyni's office—in their editorials addressed to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Council of Guardians imparted them with partial roles in helping the decision-making of the regime. At the same time Seyyed Ali Khamene'i, as the Friday prayers imam of Tehran once more emphasized that the theocratic rule is the most fundamental base of the Islamic government. He further said that the ruler of a theocracy is endowed with unlimited authorities. The president of the Islamic Republic who three weeks ago as a result of his statements concerning the limits of the government's authority was censured and reproached by Ayatollah Khomeyni, at last week's Friday prayers stated: All the legislative and executive systems of the Islamic country will be under the supervision of the theocratic rule and all its credibility will be under the confirmation of the theocratic ruler.

As of a few weeks ago all the decrees of Ayatollah Khomeyni were turned into disputable issues and reports from Tehran indicate that these decrees have even created wide differences amongst the ruling clerics. During the last few days Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime through editorials in the KEYHAN and ETTELA'AT of Tehran, has been trying to imply that the theocratic rule does not mean absolute dictatorship or a autocracy.

The Freedom Movement, as the only opposition group—whose views and declarations are not being reflected in the mass media of the Islamic Republic—recently announced that Ayatollah Khomeyni's decree is a prelude to the formation of an absolute dictatorship in Iran. Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, who one time was one of the first collaborators of Ayatollah Khomeyni in forming the Islamic Republic, in his declaration wrote: With this decree the first step has been taken toward creating a despotic theocratic government in the garb of a religious guardian-jurisprudent.

12719/9738

**Seventy Members of Tudeh Party Reportedly To Be Executed**

46400087b London KEYHAN in Persian  
18 Feb 88 p 11

[Text] A Tudeh Party official in Paris announced Friday that 70 members of the Tudeh Party, including Kiyanuri and Ehsan Tabari, now living in the Islamic regime's prisons, will probably be executed soon.

According to this official, on the basis of a statement distributed to news agencies and newspapers, the death sentence has been issued by the Islamic Republic's courts for these 70 persons, who have been living in the Islamic Republic's prisons for five years, and the Supreme Judicial Council has also confirmed this. In this statement, which quoted right-wing sources in the Islamic government, among the 70 persons mentioned are the names of several members of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran as well as the leaders of the

Feda'i-ye Khalq Majority Organization, including Tudeh Party First Secretary Nureddin-e Kiyanuri and party theorist Ehsan Tabari. Some of the arrested members of the Tudeh Party said during their television confessions that they had spied for years for the Soviet Union. Ehsan Tabari, the greatest theorist for the Tudeh Party, confessed to a great many of these matters in writing his book 'Led Astray'. In November of 1984, following the arrest of members of the Tudeh Party, ten persons were executed, including Sheltoki and 'Amu'i, two long-time members, a member of the party's central committee, and Admiral Dr Bahram Faza'i, commander of the navy.

Some time ago during a Majlis meeting a deputy asked about the outcome of the trial of the Tudeh Party members, and said: What was the outcome of these trials?

9310

#### **Majlis Representative Criticizes Government's Economic Record**

46400076a London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Jan 88 p 4

[Text] Non-execution of development projects denotes faster amortization, higher expenditures, inflation, extending of poverty throughout society and a decrease in the national gross product. After the advent of the Islamic revolution production has faced severe fluctuations. What remains now is a mammoth destruction of the formerly-allocated investments and non-utilization of the present investments in a favorable fashion.

Some time ago the aforementioned statement was made to the Islamic Consultative Assembly by Gholam-Hoseyn-e Nadi, Majlis representative from Najafabad. While severely criticizing the government's actions with regard to the execution of development projects, he said: Now I would like you to evaluate the destiny of the projects! The total number of projects which were planned for completion were 280 of which 85 projects have been transferred to 1366 [21 March 1987 - 20 March 1988] for completion. Twenty seven other projects have been transferred to the second phase to be completed in 1367 [21 March 1988 - 20 March 1989] and 22 projects have been transferred to the fourth phase which are part of continuing projects. These 134 projects which were planned to be completed by the end of 1365 [21 March 1986 - 20 March 1987] by the various organizations, all have been transferred to future years. From a total of 280 projects 146 have remained incomplete and 22 of these projects in the form of complex or under the title of one of the old projects or a new title have been included in the law of 1366. From the remaining 122 projects some merely serve as study and reference guide, some as revelational and some fulfill the previously promised engagements. Thus all lack executive and physical reality with no end in sight.

After we take out such projects, 82 will remain of which 16 have been finished, five are incomplete and the remaining should be included in the category of continuing projects. The end result is that out of 280 projects which were supposed to be completed by the end of 1365, 21 still remain to be completed by the end of 1366 and the fate of the rest is similar to what I've described.

Najafabad representative in another part of his speech addressing other delegates, stated: From the viewpoint of composition, the investment sectors have also changed. As of 1350 to 1365 [21 March 1971 - 20 March 1972 to 21 March 1986 - 20 March 1987], 31 percent of the investments were made in the service sector, this rate of investment six years after the advent of the revolution reached 36 percent and at the same time, industry and mines—which formerly received 11 percent of the investments faced a reduction to five percent. As a whole, formation of gross annual median investment during recent years have decreased considerably.

Gholam-Hoseyn-e Nadi went on to add: Lack of investment on one hand, and increase in country's population on the other are the main reasons. As a result if we want to compare the investments of six years after the advent of the revolution, namely from 1358 [21 March 1979 - 20 March 1980] to 1363 [21 March 1984 - 20 March 1985] to six years before the advent of the revolution, we will see a decrease of 25 percent and similarly if we take into consideration the investment of the last three years we will notice a 35 percent reduction.

In conclusion, he said: This reduction in investment occurs at a time when the amortization of formerly-allocated investments during recent years have had an upward trend, so much so that the rate of median annual amortization growth from 181 billion rials in 1358 had increased to 275 billion rials in 1364 [21 March 1985 - 20 March 1986]. These figures are indicative of the fact that the rate of amortized investments far exceed that of the new investments.

12719/9738

#### **New Law Requires Tax Payment on Foreign Earnings**

46400077b London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Jan 88 p 1

[Text] It was announced by the Islamic Republic that those Iranians who have foreign earnings ought to pay taxes on such incomes. From last Thursday the Islamic Consultative Assembly after proper investigation and discussions ratified new laws on direct taxes. According to this newly approved law the rate of direct taxes will increase and a new kind of tax is going to be levied on various other commodities. In the sanctioned bills—all the institutions and other organs affiliated with the Islamic Republic—will be exempt from taxes if they use their income to promote the Islamic cause and its goals.

One of the ratified bills of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of last week is as follows: All the property owners, whether real or legal, with regard to their properties in Iran, any real person if Iranian nationality residing in Iran, any real person of Iranian nationality residing abroad—with regard to all his revenues earned in Iran or abroad, and any non-Iranian individual—with regard to his incomes earned in Iran, will be required to pay taxes on his earnings.

Likewise, all the ministries and government organs whose budgets are allocated by the government, the municipalities, the Red Crescent Society, the social Security Organization, the Savings and Retirement Funds, the Islamic theological schools, the Society of Imam-e Sadeq, the Islamic revolution institutions, the State endowment Fund, also common endowment organs whose revenues are spent—according to religious laws—on such affairs as Islamic propagation, cultural, scientific, religious enhancement, inventions and discoveries, training and health matters, the Foundation for the Upkeep and Maintenance of Mosques, the centers for the presentation of religious tragedies and soup kitchens, the center responsible for the repair of ancient relics, other organs in charge of development affairs and centers responsible to reach assistance to victims of flood, earthquakes, fires, war and other unexpected events... [incomplete article].

12719/9738

#### **New Decree Likely To End Disagreement Among Officials**

46400087a *London KEYHAN in Persian*  
11 Feb 88 pp 1,3

[Text] Ayatollah Khomeyni has decreed the formation of a body to supervise the work of the Council of Guardians in designating the interests of Islam, and to eliminate the existing deadlock.

Ayatollah Khomeyni's decree reads in part: If there is no agreement between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians in terms of religious and civil law, a group shall be formed consisting of the respected theologians of the Council of Guardians, Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i, Hashemi, Ardebili, Tavasolli, Musavi Kho'iniha, Mir Hoseyn Musavi and the pertinent minister for the purpose of determining what is best for the Islamic state. If other experts are required they shall be called to the task, and after the necessary consultations a majority vote of the members of this group will be implemented.

Ayatollah Khomeyni adds: Ahmad shall participate in this group so that reports from this group can reach me sooner.

In this letter, once more the leader of the Islamic revolution said that those within the Islamic republic will be victorious in interests of the government of the Islamic republic, as well as those of the other Islamic governments—which he called Americanized Islam.

Almost a month and a half ago Ayatollah Khomeyni issued another religious decree and announced that the government is the highest authority, and that in order to continue its existence it has the right to take any step and implement any law. This decree brought much opposition among government and non-government clergy. For example, Ayatollah Mar'ashi-Najafi and Ayatollah Golpaygani were not willing to support this decree, and the Islamic republic's state-controlled newspapers severely criticized the silence of the grand ayatollahs.

Of the 12 ayatollahs who are members of the Guardian Council, only two announced their acceptance of the new decrees. The other ten ayatollahs on the Guardian Council were not willing to speak in support of Ayatollah Khomeyni's decrees. Even Emami-Kashani, member and spokesman for the Council of Guardians, made no reference to Ayatollah Khomeyni's decree in his Friday prayer sermons at the university. When he was criticized by the newspapers affiliated with the regime and several regime insiders, he said: I forgot to mention this decree at the Friday prayer!

Reports from Tehran, Qom, Mashhad and Esfahan state that unofficial leaflets strongly attacking Ayatollah Khomeyni's latest decree have been circulated in the markets and among groups by members of the Islamic societies. One of these leaflets said that grand ayatollahs Golpaygani and Mar'ashi-Najafi were under heavy pressure to approve Ayatollah Khomeyni's decree.

Following the wave of conflict within the regime of the vice-regency of the chief theologian, Ayatollah Khomeyni formed a new group to resolve the deadlock between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians.

This group has the responsibility of solving the religious and civil legal problems between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians. The theologians of the Council of Guardians, the chiefs of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, Ayatollah Tavasolli, the national prosecutor-general, the prime minister and Ahmad Khomeyni are the members of the new body.

By order of Khomeyni, the view of the majority of the attending members of this group shall be put into effect. In his letter, Khomeyni states that Ahmad shall participate in this group so that reports on its meetings can reach him more quickly.

However, it is said in Tehran that Ahmad Khomeyni, who has played an active role behind the scenes so far, is gradually playing a more public role.

Khomeyni announced the formation of the new body in a letter to high officials of the Islamic republic. Previously Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Musavi Ardebili, Mir Hoseyn Musavi and Ahmad Khomeyni stated in a letter to Ayatollah Khomeyni that in theory his recent decree concerning the absolute vice-regency of the chief theologian had solved the existing problems, but that practical problems remain, and in this letter Khomeyni was asked to expedite the formation of the new body.

9310

### **Desalinization Complex To Be Built in Chah Bahar**

46400076b London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Jan 88 p 4

[Text] The Ministry of Energy of the Islamic Republic plans to put into execution the construction of a desalinization project to provide part of the irrigation and potable water of certain section of Chah Bahar. The Italian Company of Ital Impianti will be in charge of execution of the said project and construction cost of this project is estimated at about 35 million dollars.

Technical experts believe if the Italian contracting firm begins construction of the desalinization plant of Chah Bahar from the middle of the current year, the plant will become operational in the early part of 1990. According to the reports from Italy, the Ministry of Energy of the Islamic Republic for the purpose of clarifying the details of the execution of the aforementioned project and also determining the method for securing the required expenditures, dispatched a delegation composed of experts and engineers to that country. Furthermore, the Ministry of Energy of the Islamic republic plans to build a smaller desalinization plant close to Bandar Abbas in order to provide the necessary potable water for the inhabitants of this port city. The projection capacity of this desalinization plant will be 100 cubic meters an hour. Several Japanese and West German companies have sent in their bids to the authorities of the Ministry of Energy.

According to the economic weekly MEED of London, the construction of a large desalinization complex in Bandar Abbas, was given to foreign contracting firms before the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran. The purpose for the construction of this complex was to secure the potable water needs of Bandar Abbas and also provide water for the steel complex.

With the change in the site of steel complex and its transfer to Mobarakeh near Esfahan, the subject of construction of a large desalinization complex close to Bandar Abbas lost its priority.

The above-stated weekly further wrote: Two units of Chah Bahar desalinization complex have been manufactured in Italy and will soon be transferred to Konarak which is situated close to the port of Chah Bahar. The aforementioned complex will be able to desalinize 1300

cubic meters of water in an hour. The desalinized water from this complex will be used to meet local consumption needs of the said port and that of the army.

Some economic experts believe that the Islamic Republic plans to transform Chah Bahar and its neighboring area into an important strategic region. Furthermore, these experts have announced that the officials of the Ministry of Energy of the Islamic Republic are also planning to build a large water reservoir near the said port to be used for irrigation purposes.

12719/9738

### **Tax Bill on Income Property, Real Estate Approved**

46400088 London KEYHAN in Persian 18 Feb 88 p 4

[Text] During last week's sessions the Majlis studied the Direct Taxation Bill and approved Part Three of this bill, which provides for taxation on real estate income. Article 52 of this bill states: Real or legal personal income derived from the assignment of rights to property located in Iran, after the exemptions in this law are applied, shall be subject to property taxes.

Note: Property income for companies with all their assets belonging to the government either directly or through an intermediary is not subject to the regulations in this section and will be covered in the rules for offices.

Article 53: Rental property - Income subject to taxation includes all rental property whether cash or non-cash after deduction of 25 percent for owner expenses and depreciation. Owner obligations with regard to rentals of mortmain or prison property will be calculated on the basis of this article. In mortgages the mortgager's possession shall be subject to taxation under the regulations of this section. Whenever the rental recipient is not the owner, the income subject to taxation will be the difference between the rental income received and that paid to the owner.

Note 1: Residential space for the father, mother, spouse, children or grandparents, as well as the residential space for persons supported by the owner will not be treated as rentals, unless it is documented that rent is being paid. If the owner or the persons mentioned above have several residential sites, at the owner's choice one piece of property will be tax-exempt as the owner's residence and another piece of property will be tax-exempt as the residence of all the other persons. If the owner has more than one permanent wife, a property unit for each of the wives will also be tax-exempt.

Note 2: Property made available at no charge to organizations and institutions will not be treated as rental property.

Note 3: For the purpose of property income taxes, each apartment will be treated as a separate piece of property.

Note 4: With regard to property that is rented with furniture or appliances, the income from renting the furniture or the appliances will also be counted as part of the property's income and subject to the taxes in this section.

Note 5: Improvements made according to regulations by renters during the time of rental for the benefit of the landlord will be assessed as income to the landlord according to their market value the day he takes possession, and 50 percent of that value will be subject to the taxes on annual rental income.

Note 6: Costs incurred by the landlord because of laws or regulations and which are paid on behalf of the renter, as well as expenditures paid under contract on behalf of the tenant, in the event that they are the landlord's responsibility by civil law, will be added to the ledger at the rate of the day paid and will be added to the non-cash annual rental overhead.

Article 54: The taxable rental rate is determined according to official documents, and if there is no lease or if the lease or a copy of it cannot be obtained, or if the landlord collects money in addition to the rent as a deposit or for any other purpose, the taxable rental income shall be fixed on the basis of the rental for comparable properties.

Article 56: If the landowner rents a part of the property in which he resides, up to 3,000 rials of the monthly rent the landowner collects will be exempt from the taxes provided in this law, and any excess will be taxed in accordance with the regulations in this section.

Article 57: In the case of a person who has no income, if he is single up to 25,000 rials of rental income will be exempt from the monthly taxes, and if he has a wife or children up to 50,000 rials will be exempt, and any excess will be taxed in accordance with the regulations in this section.

Article 59: Taxes on the transfer and final delivery of property acquired by the person making the transfer prior to the implementation of this law are four percent of the selling price at the time of sale.

Article 60: Income subject to taxation in the event of the final sale of property where the date of possession is after the date of this law's implementation is the amount of added value in the transaction at the time of sale compared to the time of possession, and if no taxes are levied on the transaction or if the taxes levied are less than four percent of the value of the transaction at the time of sale, the value of the transaction at the time of sale will be taxed at four percent.

Article 62: With regard to properties that change hands along with an empty storefront or place of business, if, according to the report of the tax auditor or chief tax auditor, the empty storefront or place of business

increases the property's value above what it would be otherwise because of the commercial location, the difference in value caused by the place of business will be taxed at four percent, and any value in excess of that will be taxed at eight percent.

9310

### **Ayatollah Jalili Arrested, Imprisoned for Criticism of Regime**

46400077c London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Jan 88 p 1

[Text] Ayatollah Abdoljalil Jalili, one of the famous and respected clerics of Bakhtaran Province was arrested in Tehran for criticizing the despotic policies of the Islamic Republic. Jalili who is an influential cleric of Kermanshah Province, two years ago following his criticism of the prevailing circumstances of the country, was exiled to Tehran and barred from pulpit and speech-making.

Last month, Ayatollah Jalili in order to participate in some religious ceremonies traveled to Kermanshah and once again after his criticism of the despotic policies of the regime and other social problems, he was arrested by armed agents and dispatched to Tehran.

Followers of Ayatollah Jalili in Tehran have revealed that the security agents of the guards corps have him under surveillance in order to make sure he does not leave the capital and the same agents were responsible for transferring him to Tehran and imprisoning him there.

Here it should be noted that Ayatollah Jalili believes in close cooperation between the national and religious forces and before the advent of the Islamic Republic, as a fast follower of Ayatollah Khomeyni, opposed the former regime.

12719/9738

## **PAKISTAN**

### **Noorani Blames Government for Karachi Riots**

46000098c Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
8 Feb 88 p 8

[Text] Lahore, Feb. 7: Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, President of the Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan, has accused the government of adopting a divide and rule policy and charged that the Karachi riots were being sponsored by the present rulers.

Talking to newsmen in Lahore on Sunday, the JUP chief said that the inhabitants of Karachi want to live in peace, but government lackeys are turning minor incidents into big ones.

He said political parties find themselves helpless in controlling the situation as the people freely carry illegal weapons with them.

Commenting on the strengthening of regional thinking, he said there is still a chance to call mid-term elections on party basis so as to check the deteriorating situation. He alleged that the government is weaving conspiracies within the political parties. He supported his plea by saying that all political parties rebels were joining the OML.

Talking of the Afghan issue, he said it should be resolved soon as it has already put the Palestine and Kashmir issues in the background. He alleged that Gen. Zia has been complicating the Afghan issue "in order to protect his illegitimate rule." Political parties were unable to resolve this problem in the face of the Army and the CIA.

Regarding the differences that have cropped up on the construction of Kalabagh Dam, the JUP chief explained that it is a technical matter rather than a political one. He further said that the Dam is a very simple matter of distribution of water between provinces.

Replying to a question regarding the invitation extended by Amir Jamaat-e-Islami to all political parties to form a new alliance on a broad basis, he said it was a trap.

The J.I. wanted to accept Gen. Zia after he quits as COAS, while the JUP had rejected the presidential referendum as a fraud and could not accept Gen. Zia in any position.

He said J.I. was the party which had broken its ties with PNA only to serve Gen. Zia and his martial law. He recalled that the present Amir had declared that he would launch a counter movement if the political parties staged an agitation against Gen. Zia. He categorically said that JUP would never enter into any alliance with the Jamaat Islami. Regarding any possibility of his joining the MRD, he said the JUP would consider the possibility if an invitation came from the MRD.

08309

**Neglect of Punjabi by Government Criticized**  
*46000098e Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English*  
*8 Feb 88 pp 4-5*

[Article by Afzal Haider]

[Text] It would have appealed to reason and the people of Lahore would have appreciated it had the government decided to celebrate the Golden Jubilee of the Assembly Building... an impressive structure with memories of the Islamic Summit. The interior decorators and the unknown team of honest contractors who accomplished the task of construction in an admirable manner no doubt deserve honourable mention, though the architect's concept of a small chamber of assembly was viewed as a major defect by the British Government after the building had been completed.

**Rude Shock**

But it came as a rude shock that the occasion is being termed "of great significance in the legislative history of our Province." Imagination boggles at the thought that Chief Minister and the Speaker who abjured their political parties in favour of the Martial Law umbrella and were consequently perched on the seat of power of the military rulers, have the audacity to exploit this occasion for personal benefit and try to link their rule with the democratic process, Parliamentary system and its traditions. The contradiction becomes acute as the occasion sought to be identified with parliamentary traditions is being inaugurated by the serving general who is also the Commander of the Armed Forces, former Chief Martial Law Administrator and successor of three Martial Law regimes. General Zia's regime suspended the 1973 Constitution, expressed open dislike for the parliamentary form of Government, banned the political process and political parties, prompted the clergy to proclaim disdain for democracy, deprived citizens of individual liberties and human rights, subjected his countrymen to the status of serfs, denuded the superior judiciary of constitutional obligation, imposed a nominated Majlis-e-Shoora at the Central and Provincial level, clamped Provisional Constitutional Order in 1981 to destroy constitutional and political institutions, effected unilateral amendments in the Constitution immediately after holding non-party elections thereby depriving parliament the ability to exercise its political sovereignty of amending the constitution, electing a President, Prime Minister and the cabinet and ultimately forcing through the Eighth Constitutional Amendment Act in October 1985 as the price for restoration of a deformed constitution but General Zia was invited by the Punjab Government to address an international gathering of parliamentarians. This is indeed a cruel blow to the ideology espoused by Quaid-e-Azam who is a symbol of the political process, party-based general elections, individual liberties and human dignity.

**Misleading**

Taking advantage of the fact that the Assembly Hall was constructed 50 years ago and the fiftieth year of the life of this building happens to coincide with the term of the present government nominated and imposed under the decree of Martial Law administration, the efforts of the ruling group to project this occasion as the golden jubilee of parliamentary period is obviously motivated to mislead people, distort history and provide a smoke screen for anti-people regimes. It is also calculated to appropriate legitimacy and acceptance hitherto denied by political parties and the Constitution itself. The decision to celebrate the occasion raises questions of fundamental importance. The first question is whether at the time of deciding to celebrate the occasion as Golden Jubilee, was it ever considered that for almost twenty-four years out of the forty years of our existence the country was ruled not by elected government but by Martial Law regimes? This very Assembly Hall was then the headquarter for

the abuse of human rights and political process and used for negation of parliamentary, political and constitutional institutions. This building was under the physical control of the military who subordinated the civil machinery of State to its designs and purposes. The basic criteria of a democratic form of Government is that the civil and armed bureaucracy receives orders from the civil elected government and it is the writ of the popular Government that is enforced and not vice versa. Under what principle is the present government including the twenty four years of the imposed undemocratic rule of the military in the parliamentary history of fifty years? The second question relates to the time of Khizar Hayat Khan leader of the ruling Unionist Party in the Punjab Provincial Assembly. What role did this leadership play in the Independence movement? The younger generation would like to know how the Unionist leadership reacted to the direct action campaign launched by Quaid-e-Azam when Master Tara Singh flourished his sword outside this very Assembly Hall. The other questions relate to Punjab itself. We are entitled to ask what efforts have been made by the Assembly to promote and preserve the language, culture and history of Punjab. No doubt the 1956 and 1962 constitution paid only lip service towards the languages script and cultural identities of the areas included in different provinces and the emphasis was on English, Urdu and Bengali language but Article 251 of 73 Constitution was indeed a step forward. Sub-Article (3) of Article 251 says that without prejudice to the status of the national language, a Provincial Assembly may by law prescribe measures for the teaching promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language. The Provincial Assembly failed to advance the cause of Punjab and Punjabi language. The Government is answerable to the people of Punjab as regards the implementation of this constitutional requirement of teaching promoting and use of Punjabi language. We know that the previous government which gave the 73 Constitution did not enact the required legislation but what has this government done in this direction? It is an admitted fact that no beginning has yet been made even to acknowledge the existence and use of Punjabi language. It is a pity that crores of Punjabis speak Punjabi but the majority of the literate can neither read nor write Punjabi. There is no settlement on the script as yet. Some individuals have no doubt done spade work on evolving a standard script. By now it is a settled proposition that primary education ought to be given in the mother tongue. According to the Report of the Inter-Regional Seminar on Primary Education (Nov. 1986, Islamabad) organised by the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan in collaboration with UNICEF and UNESCO, Page 98, "Education in a language other than mother tongue affects learning capacities intensely."

#### **Mother Tongue**

According to the National Education Policy and Implementation Programme of the Government of Pakistan (1969) "communication can best take place in the

mother tongue of the child at primary level. It will be a good educational practice if primary education is imparted in the approved provincial language or the National language." It suggested that "a Provisional Government may run educational institutions in the approved provincial language. In such institutions Urdu will be a compulsory subject from Class III onwards." It further stated that "in schools where the National language is the medium of instruction, one of the regional languages will be taught from class III onward." Beginning in April 1979, all students admitted to class I in all English medium schools were required to undergo instructions through the medium of Urdu or an approved provincial language which would be progressively introduced in successive grades thereafter. Even the Report of the Presidents' Task Force on Education (August 1985) suggests the same measures. We would therefore like to know whether the members of Assembly have been able to do something for providing education in the provincial language and have books for primary education in Punjabi language been made available? Nothing concrete seems to have been done by the Assembly members. They have not been able even to acknowledge through legislation the existence of Punjabi as the provincial language. Since the Indian Education Commission (1882 A.D.) so many Commissions have made recommendation regarding the medium of instruction and now when the Constitutional sanction is also available the Provincial Assembly would be fulfilling its obligation by resolving the question of Punjabi language taking positive steps to preserve and advance the cultural heritage of Punjab. There are about 370 private societies in Punjab but for lack of co-ordination, funds and patronage nothing noteworthy has so far been achieved in the field of promotion of Punjabi language. Although these societies have been formed by scholars and literary figures one cannot find a single comprehensive dictionary of Punjabi language. One wonders whether the members of the Assembly have ever bothered to check up the Assembly library to find out if a standard Punjabi dictionary is available. It is probably too much to expect because they themselves are not allowed even to speak in their mother tongue on the floor of the Assembly Hall. In a country like Afghanistan, the languages of different nationalities are used for primary and education and (Persian) DARI along with PASHTO is permitted in the political and constitutional forum. According to the concurrent Legislative list, the Provincial Assembly is competent to make laws regarding curriculum, syllabus, planning, policy, centres of excellence and standards of education (item No.38). According to successive census reports, the population of Punjab is registering a decrease. Have the members of the Assembly considered this aspect? We know that they are unanimous against the imposition of agricultural income tax and may be one day they may also take out a procession to safeguard their interests but the people feel that so long as Jagirdari and feudal attitude prevails the fruits of Independence are not going to reach the common man. It is therefore suggested that instead of wasting public money and time on celebrating the imaginary golden jubilee of the

Assembly the members of the Assembly in general and the rulers in particular should think in terms of doing a service to the language and culture of Punjab. They do not have to be on the defensive but take courage, face the realities and honour the common man's aspiration. It is not the life that matters but the courage one puts into it; otherwise members of Punjab Assembly will be remembered as successors to Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana who represented and safeguarded the interests of the landed aristocracy.

08309

### Leftist Party Proposes Alliance

46000098d Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
8 Feb 88 p 6

[Text] Multan, Feb. 7: Awami Jamhoori Party has presented a 3-point formula for an alliance of leftist parties. In this connection a 6-member coordination committee has been formed to contact the heads of Pakistan National Party, Pakistan Socialist Party, Awami National Party, Mazdoor Kisan Party (both factions), Qaumi Mahaz-e-Azadi and Pakistan Communist Party. This was disclosed by Rao Tahir, advocate, and Khadim Husasin of AJP Multan while addressing a Press conference here the other day. The AJP leaders said all other parties which opposed feudalism, capitalism and American imperialism would be welcome to join the new alliance after it was formally launched.

The AJP leaders further said that their party would seek support of all progressive political forces for the formation of the Seraiki province. "We also support the rights of smaller nationalities," they added.

Rao Masud categorically denied the report carried by a section of the Press that AJP chief, Khurshid Hasan Mir had resigned. They also criticised some PPP leaders who indulged in mud-slinging against Mr. Mir. They reminded the detractors of Mr. Mir that he had left the PPP while it was still in power and he was a Federal Minister. He did so, they added, because Khurshid Hasan Mir could not tolerate PPP's tilt towards America and its neglect of the dedicated party workers.

08309

### Jamaat-e Islami Called 'Martial Law's B Team'

46000098b Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
3 Feb 88 p 4

[Article by Minhaj Barna]

[Text] The Jama'at-i-Islami's new political stance based on its twin demand for fresh polls and resignation of General Zia from the post of Chief of the Army Staff is obviously an attempt to break out of its political isolation and restore its independent image. Its almost decade long support to and association with the Martial Law regime had eroded much of its credibility as a principled

opposition party. It was the only anti-Bhutto PNA component that continued to back military rule notwithstanding the violation of the original commitment to hold fresh elections in 90 days. The Jama'at voluntarily became a party to perpetuating the Martial Law imposed on July 5, 1977, first in the name of "accountability" and then "Islamisation."

### Other Parties

True that there were other parties too like Nasrullah Khan's PDP, Maulana Mufti Mahmud's JUI or even Wall Khan's NDP which initially extended support to the CMLA's postponement of the October 1977 elections and even joined Gen. Zia's Martial Law cabinet (with the exception of Tehrik and NDP). But soon these parties realised their mistake and withdrew their support to the regime after Gen. Zia postponed the elections for the second time in October 1979. It was then clear to them that they would be in the Martial Law cabinet, not for sharing power but for the fulfilment of a particular task, namely the execution of the Prime Minister, Mr Z.A. Bhutto. After that they were not needed.

Disillusioned and wiser, they formed the MRD along with the PPP, their erstwhile adversary. But the Jamaat continued to back military rule and its Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA).

It was ironic that a party which opposed Ayub Khan's Martial Law and supported Parliamentary democracy as against the so-called "Basic Democracy" (Mr. Bhutto at that time was with Ayub Khan and supported his Basic Democracy in addition to being the Secretary-General of his Convention Muslim League) went on to uphold an authoritarian setup in the name of Islam and "Islamisation." The fact was that both Gen. Zia and the Jama'at needed each other and therefore helped each other within their limitations. The Jama'at extended support to the regime's actions and policies while the regime, on its part, provided assistance to the Jama'at and allowed it to carry on political activities which were banned for others. It was allowed to work among the Afghan refugees and to collect funds and weapons which used to be passed on to the militants of the students' wing, the IJT.

### Change

For the Jama'at the situation, however, changed following the 1985 elections and the lifting of Martial Law. Gen. Zia was no more the sole repository of power. The new realities were the induction of a civilian government headed by Mohammad Khan Junejo, the emergence of the official Muslim League, and existence of a parliament in which the Jama'at was in a small minority, not in a position to force any issue. Initially it backed "the Zia-Junejo" regime and opposed the demand for mid-term polls thinking it would get the same "Privileged" treatment as it used to during the Martial Law period. Its disappointment came when its sponsored "Shariat Bill" was opposed by the Treasury benches despite the tacit

backing the Jama'at got from President Zia who once or twice publicly admonished the members of the Assembly and the Senate for being slow on "Islamisation."

The Jama'at's additional frustration was caused by its failure to get the ban on the IJT lifted. And it received a jolt when the Muslim League Government in Sind ousted its Mayor, Abdus Sattar Afghani, who almost controlled Karachi as the head of the city's municipal body.

What is the meaning of the Jama'at's new stance. To what extent is its opposition to the regime and its commitment to democratic principles real? Its past shows that while it has changed its position on various issues it remains wedded to its narrow fundamentalist essence. The new 12-point economic programme can hardly impress people as its new points such as cancellation of land allotments in Sind to generals and bureaucrats or distribution of state land among the landless peasants are the same that other parties have been stressing long before the Jama'at adopted them.

Despite its pronounced opposition to feudalism and capitalism it has not spelt out as to how it is going to do away with them. The new Amir, Oazi Hussain Ahmad, has also announced his party's determination to pursue the "Shariat Bill" which is being opposed not only by the modernists but many ulema as well.

The Jama'at will take a long time to erase the impression in the minds of the people that it has been the Martial Law's "B" team. Only by actions and consistently upholding the democratic norms can it establish its credentials as a socially useful entity.

08309

#### **Editorial Blasts Zia on Democracy**

46000098a Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*  
7 Feb 88 p 4

[Editorial: "General Zia and Democracy"]

[Text] President Ziaul Haq's observations at the golden jubilee celebrations of the Punjab Assembly that western democracy and the parliamentary system are not suited to Pakistan come at a time when the government itself is eminently satisfied with all that it has done to strengthen democracy in the country. In fact echoes of the self-congratulatory applause over the recently held local bodies polls can still be heard as the government prepares for another exercise in electing representatives. While there are several aspects of the present process that can be criticised as not being democratic enough, there is also much in it that is commendable, keeping in view the straitened circumstances under which it is being

undertaken. The enervating influence of the country's longest martial law and its legacy of restrictive laws cannot be easily ignored, specially when there are voices to emphasise this unhappy fact. The imminence of strength and the will to exercise it are factors that have become important tangibles in the politics of the country. The political managers of the present government, therefore, must function within strict parameters, a task which can be made more difficult by comments that are hardly calculated to further the march of democracy.

The President's views, apart from being at variance with the action of his own government, however, tend to controvert issues which have never been points of contention in the country. In fact, in all the forty years of Pakistan's history, the only point that has enjoyed the consensus of all political parties is democracy. In the manifestoes of the various permutations of the forces of dissent in the country over the years, like the DAC, NDF, COP, PNA and now MRD, the foremost demand was for democracy. The demand was never cluttered by such nuances as "western" or "Islamic" as democracy was essentially seen as a framework within which a government could function, whether Islamic or secular. In fact, democracy is merely one of several systems of governance. The others cover a wide spectrum which includes fascism, military dictatorship, monarchy, communism, etc. But democracy is by and large preferred by most people in spite of its feebleness and the unhappy fact that it is easily dismantled by the practitioners of force. It is an open and representative system and is most appropriate for an Islamic government with its accent on popular consultation and consensus. The Islamist parties, which are ardent supporters of democracy, never found anything un-Islamic in it nor ever prescribed a variable of the concept. Even in the PNA movement, the demands for democracy and Nizam-i-Mustafa were raised together.

The President's observation on democracy, parliamentary system and the country's only two known democratic successes—the constitutions of 1956 and 1973—are, therefore, difficult to understand. His views on the failure of the politicians and such other generalities are correct and merely repeat what is already known. But his impassioned appeal in favour of a system which is yet to be defined beyond the language of rhetoric, coming at a time when every effort is being made to strengthen the sapling of democracy, which he rightly claims to have planted, cannot be easily appreciated. It is somewhat late to again effect major changes in the country without raising serious doubts about the genuineness of the promise of devolution of power to civilian hands. But then if there is an element of earnestness in the advocacy of such new directions and changes in the prevailing system, then the implications will obviously be ominous.

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